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The public forum doctrine protects a right of access—“First
Amendment easements”—to streets and parks and other traditional
places for public expression.1 It is well known that the doctrine was
articulated by the Supreme Court in a series of cases in the 1930s and
1940s.2 Lesser known are the historical circumstances that surrounded

* Ph.D., History, University of California Berkeley; J.D., Stanford Law School.
1. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, SUP. CT. REV 1,
13 (1965).
2. On the history of the public forum doctrine, see ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL
DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT, ch. 6; Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak,
The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment
Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219 (1984); Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech In Public
Places, SUP. CT. REV. 233 (1974); Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In
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its creation. In a new, modern world where the mass media dominated
public discourse—where the “soap box . . . [had ceded] to the radio and
political pamphlet[s] to the monopoly newspaper[s]”3—critics expressed
deep anxieties that mass communications had undermined the possibility
of widespread participation in politics, public life, and democratic
“public discussion.”4 The public forum doctrine was one response to
this concern.
This article describes the development of the public forum doctrine
in the context of a larger story about the nation’s efforts in this period to
come to terms with its first modern crisis of communication. This crisis
was precipitated by dawning public awareness of the fundamental
contradiction of mass communications: that the mass media had become
indispensable to public discussion yet at the same time deeply threatened
it. Without the mass media, a culturally diverse and geographically
dispersed public could not communicate across social and spatial
boundaries. At the same time, the mass media undermined the public’s
ability to communicate meaningfully. The street-corner preacher and
soapbox orator could not compete with the mass media for a public
audience. Poor and disfavored groups could not use the media to
express their views, and media owners skewed the news to suit their
political interests.
This crisis of communication became a crisis in freedom of speech.
In the 1930s, the Supreme Court identified the paramount values of the
First Amendment as freedom of expression and freedom of public
discussion.5 Government noninterference with private expression, the
Court assumed, would lead to robust and open public discussion of
political affairs, the essence of democratic self-governance.6 Yet the rise
of vast media empires in the 1930s demonstrated how an unregulated
press could distort public opinion and quash the expression of non-media
speakers. By World War II, the Court and the public had acknowledged
the tensions between freedom of expression and the ideal of public
discussion in the mass media age.7 This was the paradox of the modern
First Amendment, and its recognition marked a turning point. It
Defense of Categories, 1992 SUP. CT. REV 79 (1992); Richard T. Pfohl, Hague v. CIO and the Roots
of the Public Forum Doctrine: Translating the Limits of Powers into Individual Rights, 28 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 533 (1993).
3. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1641, 1643 (1967).
4. Id. at 1641-47.
5. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 3.
6. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 3.
7. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 3.
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spawned a contentious national debate on the meaning of freedom of
speech under the new system of modern mass communications—radio,
motion pictures, and mass publishing.
One byproduct of this dialogue was an affirmative theory of the
First Amendment as a state obligation to provide the public with the
means to carry out public discussion.8 Advocates of this view argued
that freedom of speech had a necessary economic component.9 When
privately-owned media companies controlled the means of
communication, economic inequalities were communicative inequalities.
The government must compel privately-owned media to facilitate the
speech of non-media speakers and itself provide alternative means of
communication to those unable to access the media.
The centerpiece of this vision was the concept of the democratic
public forum. I use the term “public forum” to refer to any venue,
privately or publicly owned, that is devoted to public discussion—the
exchange of diverse and competing views on matters of public
concern—and to that end, facilitates the speech of groups and
individuals who would not otherwise have access to communications
media. The public forum is both a site for public debate and a means of
communication for the less privileged. In the 1930s and 1940s,
intellectuals and activists sought to enlist the state in the creation of
“public forums” on the radio, in print journalism, and in public space.
This article examines this public forum movement and its enduring
impact on the free speech doctrine and social thought. The period
between 1930 to the end of World War II saw the emergence of what
remain contested questions: the extent to which freedom of speech
protects access to the means of communication, and the role of the state
in correcting the inequalities in the ability to communicate produced by
the mass media.10 I want to complicate the existing historiography of
freedom of speech by embedding the development of the doctrine within
the social history of mass communications. The foundational free
speech principles articulated in this period were not only the result of a
national conversation about rights, but a parallel dialogue about the

8. See Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71
IOWA. L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1986); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimating Myth,
1984 DUKE L. J., 1, 8-10 (1984).
9. See, e.g., sources in note 8, supra.
10. See, e.g., infra note 11.
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social impact of mass communications and their transformation of the
meaning of democratic speech.11
This article also illuminates the historical origins of the “market
dysfunction” argument that has dominated recent First Amendment
debates—that the ideal of democratic self-governance cannot exist
alongside “monopoly control of the media, [and] access limitations
suffered by disfavored or impoverished groups”12 and that the state must
“counteract the skew of public debate attributable to the market and thus
preserve the essential conditions of democracy.”13 This critique did not
originate in the latter twentieth century but was developed in the World
War II era.14 The public and the courts in this period were not in the
thrall of a “romantic” vision of freedom of speech, as they have been
accused—gripped by a belief that “the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is freely
accessible”15—nor entirely insensitive to the problem of average citizens
getting ideas before a public audience.16 Rather, they were conscious of
the perils posed by concentrated ownership of mass communications and
the fact that the mass communication industries hindered if not
foreclosed public access to the means of effective public
communication.
11. In this era, the Supreme Court adopted the modern civil libertarian interpretation of
freedom of speech—that because of its intimate connection to the democratic process, freedom of
speech occupied a “preferred position” in the scheme of constitutional liberties that warranted
heightened judicial solicitude. As Harry Kalven, Jr. has written, this was the period when “speech
starts to win.” See HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
AMERICA, 167 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988). See G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of
Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299 (1996);
STEVEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2008);
Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the
Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1 (2000); David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1699 (1991).
12. Ingber, supra note 8, at 5.
13. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 788 (1987).
14. For the work of latter twentieth century First Amendment scholars, see Barron, supra note
3; Fiss, supra note 13; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH
(1993).
15. This was the critique leveled by Barron in his pathbreaking 1967 article Access to the
Press. According to Barron, “[o]ur constitutional theory is in the grip of a romantic conception of
free expression.” “While we protect expression once it has come to the fore, our law is indifferent
to creating opportunities for expression.” Barron called for “legal intervention if novel and
unpopular ideas are to be assured a forum—unorthodox points of view which have no claim on
broadcast time and newsspace as a matter of right are in [a] poor position to compete with those
aired as a matter of grace.” Barron, supra note 3, at 1641; see discussion infra Part IV. On the
enduring impact of Barron’s work, see articles published in the symposium in the George
Washington Law Review titled Access to the Press: 1967 to 2007 and Beyond: A Symposium
Honoring Jerome A. Barron’s Path-Breaking Article, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 819 (2008).
16. See Barron, supra note 3, at 1652.
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Part I of this article establishes the background for the movement to
create public forums for speech by examining responses to the advent of
the mass media in the first decades of the twentieth century. I frame the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence in this period as part of
a national debate about democracy and communication in the new massmediated environment. The story of the evolution of modern free speech
doctrine is inextricably intertwined with the social experience of mass
communications.
Part II looks at efforts to resolve the contradictions of mass
communications through an affirmative theory of freedom of speech, as
it came to be articulated in a nationwide effort to turn broadcasting into a
public forum. A broadcast reform movement in the 1930s pressured the
Federal Communications Commission to use its licensing authority to
compel station owners to present competing viewpoints on public affairs
in the interest of “public discussion.” The constitutional rationale for
this was the “scarcity doctrine”—because of the limited number of radio
frequencies, the government could, consistent with the First
Amendment, supervise broadcast content in order to facilitate the
dissemination of diverse views to the public and the inclusion of all
social groups in public discourse. Despite the acceptance of the scarcity
rationale by the courts and the Commission, radio never became the
public forum that the reformers desired.
Part III looks at a similar campaign to turn newspapers into public
forums through right of access laws and balanced content requirements
enforced by the state. This effort foundered on the historical tradition
against state interference with editorial control over press content and
prior restraints on publishing. By 1945, the Supreme Court had
concluded, and media reform advocates conceded, that the only
mechanisms to achieve viewpoint diversity in print journalism,
consistent with the First Amendment, were antitrust enforcement to
diversify ownership and social pressure on publishers to fulfill their
public obligation to present a wide range of views.17
Part IV looks at the Court’s acknowledgement of the link between
economic and communicative inequalities, and the tension between the
ideals of freedom of expression and public discussion, in its
development of the public forum doctrine. The public forum cases
interpreted the First Amendment to guarantee access to certain kinds of
public property for expressive purposes. This was essential, the Court

17. See infra Part III.
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suggested, because of mass media’s domination of public discourse.18
Because average citizens could not use the mass media for
communication, and because the First Amendment did not permit a right
of access to privately owned communication facilities, freedom of
speech protects a right to reach a public audience in the streets,
commons, and parks.19
I. THE PARADOX OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS
In the early twentieth century, the introduction of new media
technologies into American society altered virtually every dimension of
public and private life. The nation’s love-hate relationship with the mass
media began. Critics recognized that the mass media had become
essential for communication in the vast and diverse nation that the
United States had become.20 Yet at the same time, the media
undermined the average citizen’s ability to participate in politics,
community, and public life. This contradiction lies at the core of the
history of mass communications and modern freedom of speech. It
preoccupied the people who lived through this social transformation.
The American people were awash in a sea of communications, as
historian Warren Susman discusses, yet feared that the mass media had
robbed them of their ability to communicate effectively.21 Their outlook
on the future of the media age was marked by “significant hopes” and
“significant doubts.”22
A.

The Modern Communications Revolution

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first
quarter of the twentieth century, the United States experienced a mass
communications revolution. Old media technologies, such as newspaper
printing, became cheaper and more efficient, and new communications
technologies were developed and disseminated to a growing urban
populace. The mass-market newspaper industry expanded dramatically
beginning in the late nineteenth century.23 Antebellum “penny papers”

18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. See, e.g., WARREN I. SUSMAN, CULTURE AS HISTORY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1973).
21. See generally id. at ch. 14 & 252-70.
22. Id. at 260.
23. PAUL STARR, THE CREATION OF THE MEDIA: POLITICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
COMMUNICATIONS 252 (2004).
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became powerful, advertising-driven metropolitan dailies and chains,
proffering so-called “yellow journalism” to audiences of millions. By
1900, there were 94 papers per 100 households; in 1927, the total
circulation of daily newspapers was over 42 million, or nearly 2 per
household.24 By 1920, 90% of Americans were estimated to be
newspaper readers.25 During the early twentieth century, motion
pictures became the premiere form of public entertainment, and radio
entered American homes.
Criticisms of the media, and its effects on social life, were bitter
and voluminous.26 Social elites claimed that publishers corrupted public
morals by pandering to the vulgar tastes of the working classes with
sensationalism, scandal, and lies.27 Progressive reformers also launched
a political critique of the media: journalism posed a threat to democracy
because publishing had become a big business, and publishers distorted
the news to serve the interests of capital.28 Mass media had become—
dangerously—the public’s sole outlook on reality. As the critic Walter
Lippmann had written, “the quack, the charlatan, the jingo and the
terrorist . . . flourish . . . where the audience is deprived of independent
access to information.”29 And yet it was widely recognized that the
media were indispensable to the workings of modern society. As
journalist Will Irwin observed in 1911, “the complex organism of
modern society could no more move without [newspapers] than a man
could move without filaments and ganglia.”30
The response to these concerns by the Progressive movement,
which sought to ameliorate social ills through social welfare legislation,
was to call for regulation of the press. Between the 1890s and the 1920s,
states and municipalities passed laws that—among reforms—required
journalists to sign all articles or editorials, criminally punished the
printing, publishing, and selling of publications devoted to “criminal
news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories

24. For circulation figures, see ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE, THE DAILY NEWSPAPER IN AMERICA:
THE EVOLUTION OF A SOCIAL INSTRUMENT 726, 729, 731 (1947).
25. Id. at 726, 731.
26. See, e.g., Francis Fenton, The Influence of Newspaper Presentations Upon the Growth of
Crime and Other Anti-Social Activity, AM. J. SOC., Nov. 1910, at 342.
27. Id.
28. Id. The press “‘habitually and continually and as a matter of business practice every form
of mendacity known to man, from the suppression of the truth and the suggestion of the false to the
lie direct.’” Id. at 344.
29. WALTER LIPPMANN, LIBERTY AND THE NEWS 54-55 (1919).
30. Will Irwin, The American Newspaper, COLLIER’S, Jan.-June 1911, reprinted in KILLING
THE MESSENGER 126 (Tom Goldstein, ed. 1989).
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of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime,”31 and that imposed civil and
criminal liability for media invasions of privacy.32 In 1915, one writer
noted a “distinct trend towards regulation of the American press.”33
“[E]very evidence that the legislator who has been looking for new
fields of business to regulate has now turned his attention to the press.”34
Claiming “freedom of the press,” publishers challenged these laws,
often unsuccessfully.35 Before the 1930s, courts tended to interpret the
right to freedom of speech as subservient to the greater social good, as
defined by the social elite.36 Although prior restraints were proscribed,
subsequent punishment of speech that had a “bad tendency,” that
allegedly threatened public safety or morals, was seen a legitimate
exercise of the state’s police powers.37 The bad tendency rule was
applied to the press. Criminal libel, obscenity and contempt convictions
involving the press were upheld against First Amendment challenge in
federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court.38 As Justice White
had written for the majority in the 1918 case Toledo Newspapers v.
United States, upholding the conviction of a newspaper editor for
contempt of court for publishing information during a trial that was
“reasonably likely” to impair the administration of justice, “the
safeguarding and fructification of free and constitutional institutions is
the very basis and mainstay upon which the freedom of the press rests
and that freedom therefore does not and cannot be held to include the

31. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 522-23 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
32. See LINDA LAWSON, TRUTH IN PUBLISHING: FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE PRESS’S
BUSINESS PRACTICES 1880-1920, 65-67 (1993).
33. Regulating the Press, THE NATION, Apr. 1, 1915, at 348.
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., State v. McKee, 49 L.R.A. 542 (1900); In re Banks, 56 Kan. 242 (1895); State v.
Van Wye, 136 Mo. 227 (1896); State v. Pioneer Press, 100 Minn. 173 (1907).
36. The entire entry on freedom of the press in a 1901 encyclopedia stated that it “consists in
the right to publish, with impunity, the truth, with good motives and for justifiable ends, whether it
respects governments or individuals.” It did not protect publications that “from their blasphemy,
obscenity, or scandalous character, may be a public offense, or as by their falsehood and malice . . .
may injuriously affect the standing, reputation, or pecuniary interests of individuals.” FELDMAN,
supra note 11, at 234.
37. State laws were analyzed under state constitutional provisions that paralleled the First
Amendment. It was not until 1925, in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666-67 (1925), that the
First Amendment, through the Fourteenth, was made binding on states. For the authoritative
account of the history of free speech before the 1930s, see DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS
FORGOTTEN YEARS (1997).
38. In the 1907 case Patterson v. Colorado, the Supreme Court upheld a finding of criminal
contempt, noting that the First Amendment did not limit subsequent punishment of speech that
impeded the proper administration of justice—only prior restraints. 205 U.S. 454 (1907). See Fox
v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915); Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
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right virtually to destroy such institutions.”39 Liberty of the press, courts
were fond of saying, was not to be used as a license for its abuse.40
B.

The Optimistic View: Freedom of Expression and Public
Discussion

A civil libertarian movement in the World War I era challenged
these content-based restrictions on speech and press. In the process, it
reframed the First Amendment in terms of the social interest in “public
discussion,” the basis of the democratic process. The ideal of public
discussion was used to justify state noninterference with private speech
and the workings of the press. The assumption was that when citizens
and editors were allowed to speak freely, without the threat of official
punishment, public debate would flourish, and through it, the people
would govern themselves.
The Progressive movement had supported the government
crackdown against dissenters during World War I, claiming the interests
of society as a whole trumped individual liberties.41 Yet Progressive
intellectuals at the vanguard of an emergent civil libertarian
movement—philosopher John Dewey, Harvard law professor Zechariah
Chafee, and Louis Brandeis, among the most notable—challenged the
Espionage and Sedition Acts and criticized the suppression of speech
that did not pose a clear and present danger to public safety.42 Prewar
movements for freedom of speech had characterized it as an individual
liberty akin to freedom of contract. This was anathema to the
Progressives’ deep hatred of the Lochner43 decision and their advocacy
of social welfare legislation and extensive legislative control over
economic affairs.44 The Progressive civil libertarians resolved this
dilemma by resting the basis of free speech on the social interest in free
speech, which they described as public participation in democratic
public discussion.45
In his 1920 book Freedom of Speech, Chafee, who would remain a
leading public intellectual and free speech theorist for over thirty years,
also described a “search for truth” rationale that saw freedom of speech

39. Id.
40. Id. at 419-20.
41. MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL
LIBERTARIANISM, 76 (1991).
42. See generally id.
43. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
44. See Graber, supra note 41, at ch. 2 & 3.
45. Id.
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as necessary for the “social interest in the attainment of truth, so that the
country may . . . adopt the wisest course of action.”46 Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes would use this reasoning in his famous 1919 dissent in
Abrams v. United States.47 Only when individuals are able to express
themselves freely without state interference, he wrote, could there be
“free trade in ideas,” with the best ones winning in the competition.48
Yet it was the public discussion model, which linked free speech to
democratic deliberation, which became the leading justification for the
expansion of free expression rights by the Supreme Court in the 1930s.
As Justice Brandeis wrote famously in his concurrence in Whitney v.
California, the individual’s liberty to speak was not only valuable in its
own right, but as a means of fostering the public discussion necessary
for democratic self-governance.49 Participation in public discussion was
the duty of every citizen in a democratic society.50
In a string of cases, even before the “1937 turn” and the Roosevelt
appointees, majorities on the Court used the concept of “freedom of
discussion” to invalidate the convictions of religious minorities,
socialists, communists, and union activists under state laws restricting
various forms of public speech that did not pose a clear and present
danger to public safety.51 “The maintenance of the opportunity for free
political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means . . .
is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system,” the majority
noted in Stromberg v. California, from 1931.52 Because free expression
is “the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every . . . form of
freedom,”53 freedom of speech occupied a “preferred position” in the
scheme of constitutional liberties that warranted heightened judicial
solicitude.54 State action that infringed free expression and “free
discussion” by regulating speech on the basis of content was now
presumed unconstitutional.

46. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 36 (1920).
47. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). As Holmes wrote, “[t]he best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” Id. at 630.
48. Id. at 630.
49. 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927).
50. Id. at 375.
51. See e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
52. Id. at 369.
53. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
54. On the “preferred position” theory on the Court in this era, see White, supra note 11, at
330-32.
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The threat of punishment chilled expression; when it was removed,
the Court assumed, the natural processes of social ordering would lead to
State noninterference with
vigorous debate on public affairs.55
expression would encourage the participation of all social groups,
particularly minority groups, in the self-governing process.56 In the
Depression and New Deal, with the rise of organized labor, a population
one-third of recent immigrant origin, and President Roosevelt’s efforts to
court a broad and inclusive electorate, “freedom of discussion”
symbolized the Court’s embrace of an emerging model of pluralist
democracy—the notion of a diverse people who shared a cultural
commitment to govern themselves through democratic processes
characterized by fair bargaining.57
This connection between free expression and “freedom of
discussion” presumes certain speech conditions. It assumes that, short of
obstacles posed by the state, all willing speakers have the means to
participate in public discourse and communicate their ideas to a public
audience. By the 1930s, however, these conditions no longer existed.
When the First Amendment was framed, communication was relatively
cheap—starting a paper required comparatively little financial outlay
and town meetings were widely attended.58 But it did not fit the new
world of mass communications, where speech opportunities were scarce,
costly, and unequally distributed.59 This realization, as we will see in
Part IV, would come slowly to the Court.60
C.

The Discussion Theory of the Press

The Court’s view of the press under the discussion model was
optimistic: a free press leads to free discussion. In its envisioned
“‘world of debate about public affairs,’”61 the press played a central role.
In fact, the Court suggested, under modern conditions, public discourse
and the processes of political deliberation could not take place without
the press.62

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See generally FELDMAN, supra note 11.
Id.
Id. at 332-33.
Id.
Id.
On the disjuncture between the “Holmes” and “Brandeis” models of free speech, see
SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, at 28.
61. Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 629 (1990).
62. See generally id.
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During the first third of the twentieth century, the United States had
transformed from a rural society of discrete “island communities” to a
mass society knit together by national politics and industry, the
administrative state, and mass communication and transportation
systems.63 Although the culture was in many ways nationalizing and
homogenizing, immigration was diversifying the social fabric and the
population was disseminating across the continent. Sociologists began
to recognize that communication in a heterogeneous, far-flung society
could not occur in the absence of common experiences and frames of
reference.64 In modern mass society, in the absence of the directly
shared activities, homogeneous backgrounds, and geographic proximity
that bound together residents of the small community, the only vehicle
for disseminating these systems of collective representation was the
mass media. Sociologist Robert Park believed the news media could
create a “general understanding and a community of interest among all
parties sufficient to make discussion possible.”65 For Park, the purpose
of the news was not only to represent and inform but to stimulate inquiry
and dialogue—to “‘make people talk.’”66 Public opinion, the political
will of the public and the basis for collective action, was a product of
discourse; it emerged “from the discussions of individuals attempting to
formulate and rationalize their individual interpretations of the news,” he
wrote.67
In its cases dealing with the institutional press in the 1930s and
early 1940s, the Court, adopting a similar view, intimated that the most
important function of the news media is to generate public discourse
through the dissemination of common information on “matters of public
concern,” which it defined in 1941 as “all issues about which
information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to
cope with the exigencies of their period.”68 As Justice Murphy observed
in 1943, newspapers and radio, which surpassed traditional forms of
social authority, including the school and the “pulpit,” had “assume[d] a

63. See ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 (David Donald ed., 1967).
64. Robert E. Park, News and the Power of the Press, AM. J. SOC. vol. 47, no. 1, 1, 6 (1941).
As Robert Post observes, “Communication requires not merely common information, but also
commonly accepted standards of meaning and evaluation.” Persons who do not share a minimum
set of such standards simply cannot understand one another. Post, supra note 61, at 636.
65. See Park, supra note 64.
66. Robert E. Park, News as a Form of Knowledge: A Chapter in the Sociology of
Knowledge, AM. J. SOC. vol. 45, no. 5, 669, 679 (1940). The essence of the news was that it would
cause in the listener “a desire to repeat it to someone.” Id. at 677.
67. Park, supra note 64, at 2.
68. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1941).
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function and responsibility of . . . wide reach and importance in the life
of the nation” and become major media of “public discussion.”69 In this
model of the press, the mass media allowed diverse audiences to “think
about the same things at the same time and thus share a version of social
reality,” and created a “public community,” one that perceived itself as
unified by “shared . . . interests, common experience . . . , and a deep
sense of interdependence,” to use the words of journalism historian
David Paul Nord.70
We can see this view of the press as an essential catalyst to public
discussion in several decisions in this period extending the principle of
“freedom of discussion” to justify state noninterference with
journalism.71 In Near v. Minnesota, the first case in which the Court
applied heightened scrutiny to a law burdening freedom of press, the
majority invalidated a state nuisance law that prohibited “malicious,
scandalous, and defamatory” publications.72 The law had been passed
by the state legislature and enacted for specific use against a salacious
and anti-Semitic Minneapolis “scandal sheet” that had viciously
criticized public officials.73 The law was aimed at stopping the
excitement of scandal and material that “disturb[ed] the peace of the
The majority characterized the law as an
community.”74
unconstitutional prior restraint75 and the essence of censorship.76 In the

69. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 232 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
70. DAVID PAUL NORD, COMMUNITIES OF JOURNALISM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
NEWSPAPERS AND THEIR READERS 111, 128 (2001).
71. There has been much debate about whether the Court in this period implicitly granted
independent significance to the press clause. See David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23
UCLA L. REV. 77 (1975); Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is Freedom of the Press A
Redundancy: What does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 639 (1975); Margaret A.
Blanchard, The Institutional Press and Its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 SUP. CT. L. REV. 225
(1978); David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429 (2002); C. Edwin Baker,
The Independent Significance of the Press Clause Under Existing Law, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955
(2007).
72. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 701 (1931). Near and Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297
U.S. 233 (1936), have typically been described in terms of a Fourth Estate model of the press, which
sees the constitutional function of the press as a fourth institution outside government that serves as
an additional check on the three official branches by monitoring and alerting the public to
governmental misdeeds. But this model, as it is described in Near and Grosjean, is also a discourse
model. By focusing attention on official wrongdoing, the press creates among readers a concern
with democratic governance, producing discussion leading to political action. On the watchdog or
Fourth Estate model, see Randall P. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731,
735 (1977); David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983).
73. Near, 283 U.S. at 701-04.
74. Id. at 709.
75. Id. at 723.
76. Id. at 713.
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state legislature’s view of the press, newspapers disrupted communities
and public order by publishing controversial news.77 In the Court’s
emerging model, a press that excited scandal by focusing attention on
current events generated democratically valuable public discussion.78 A
law that prohibited the excitement of controversy and a clash of opinion
was “‘equivalent to a prohibition of discussions.’”79
The crucial relationship of the press to the shared civic
consciousness necessary for public discussion was again invoked in the
1941 case Bridges v. California, in which a majority led by Justice
Black, applying the clear and present danger test to contempt actions,
invalidated the conviction of a prominent metropolitan paper, the Los
Angeles Times-Mirror, for contempt of court for criticism of ongoing
judicial proceedings.80 The anti-labor newspaper had published an
editorial that called on the state court to deny parole for two union
members convicted of property destruction during a labor dispute.81
Disputes involving labor were among the most controversial issues of
the day, Black noted.82 If reported on in the press, they would become
major topics of public discussion. The strict rule on contempt removed
the current controversies that commanded the most public interest from
the “arena of public discussion”83 at “the precise time when public
interest in the matters discussed would naturally be at [their] height.84
. . . when the audience would be most receptive.”85 “An endless series
of moratoria on public discussion, even if each were very short, could
hardly be dismissed as an insignificant abridgment of freedom of
expression.”86 By bringing public attention to “controversies,” Black
suggested, the press provided the public with the stimuli for
conversation.87 By focusing interest on labor disputes, trials, “issues and
officials,” the press, particularly in anonymous and fragmented urban

77. See generally id.
78. See generally id.
79. Near, 283 U.S. at 722. In dicta in Grosjean v. American Press, in which the Court struck
down a Louisiana law that imposed a license tax on advertising for the highest circulation papers in
the state, Justice Sutherland noted the essential role of the press in focusing readers’ attention on
“common interests,” allowing the public to “unite[ ] for [its] . . . common good” as “members of an
organized society.” 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936).
80. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
81. Id. at 271-72.
82. Id. at 268-69.
83. Id. at 269.
84. Id. at 268.
85. Id. at 269.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 268-69.
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environments such as Los Angeles, created among readers the necessary
sense of common identity and interest for public discussion.
There is a certain logic to this view of the modern press as
necessary to public discussion, but its idealism should be obvious. It
assumes that editors and publishers are driven by civic concerns rather
than self-interested political objectives. It assumes that the public has
the ability to respond to what it sees in the papers. These presumptions
were out of step with the attacks on the media in this era. Many critics
on the left in the 1930s described the mass media as incompatible with
the ideal of democratic public discussion.88
D.

The Pessimistic View: Mass Media and the Demise of Discussion

As should be clear by now, American society in this period had a
conflicted, even schizophrenic, relationship to mass communications.
As we have seen, social scientists recognized the potential of the media
to facilitate communication in a heterogeneous, dispersed mass society.89
As Hadley Cantril and Gordon Allport noted in a 1935 study of
broadcasting, radio exposed the public to new and diverse streams of
thought while leveling social distinctions and creating a “community of
interest,” making it a “powerful agent of democracy.”90 If the popular
culture of the time is any indication, strains of this same optimism were
shared by the culture at large.91 But the hopes were often overshadowed
by a bleak and pessimistic view that became even darker and more
cynical as the 1930s progressed. Alarmed by political developments in
Europe, the rise of the American advertising industry, and what some
described as Roosevelt’s home-grown dictatorship, the public worried
increasingly about what was described as the “propaganda menace.”92
According to critics, the mass media negated the possibility of a
genuinely participatory democracy and brought about the conditions for

88. See discussion infra Part I.D.
89. On the origins of the academic field of communication studies in this period, see DANIEL
J. CZITROM, MEDIA AND THE AMERICAN MIND: FROM MORSE TO MCLUHAN (1982); DAN
SCHILLER, THEORIZING COMMUNICATION: A HISTORY (1996); MASS COMMUNICATION AND
AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT: KEY TEXTS, 1919-1968 (John Durham Peters & Peter Simonson
eds., 2004) [hereinafter KEY TEXTS].
90. Hadley Cantril & Gordon Allport, The Influence of Radio upon Mental and Social Life,
from The Psychology of Radio (1935), reprinted in KEY TEXTS, supra note 89, at 111.
91. On the public’s fascination with issues and themes revolving around communication, see
SUSMAN, supra note 20.
92. KEY TEXTS, supra note 89, at 81.
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fascism—the subversion of the popular mind by political and corporate
interests.93
Media criticism came to constitute its own literary genre and
cottage industry in the 1930s. It is difficult to summarize the many,
diverse critiques of mass communications that filled the pages of books
and academic journals, but they might be grouped under two broad
themes. One was a structural critique: concentrated, private ownership
of newspapers and radio stations produced a dangerous ideological
homogeneity that distorted and biased the news. Another line of
criticism focused on the media’s impact on interpersonal relationships.
Audiences tuned out from public affairs, avoided face-to-face interaction
with their peers, and instead immersed themselves in silent, solitary
consumption of the media’s distorted, fantastic unreality. The upshot
was the demise of community, public engagement in social life, and the
democratic process. Through their monopoly over the means of
communication and the wellsprings of public thought, the mass media
would create a public that was mute and passive, one that ceded control
over political governance and public morals to the self-interested owners
and operators of the communication industries.
1. The Evils of Concentration
The Atlantic Monthly held a contest for readers on the subject of
press freedom, and the winning entry is revealing: the media were no
longer “trustees of constitutional liberty,” the prizewinner wrote, but
“the beneficiaries of a special privilege tending to be concentrated in
fewer and fewer hands.”94 The 1930s saw the rise of the one-paper
town, network radio, and the multimedia chain. High entry costs to
publishing led to a declining number of daily newspapers in the face of
the highest circulations on record.95 From 1930 to 1944, while daily
newspaper circulation rose from 39 to 46 million, the number of dailies
dropped more than 10%.96 By 1941, of the about 900 commercial radio
stations that had been licensed, 730 of them were gathered into one of
the four major networks.97
Never before had newspapers been so wholly dominated by
concentrated business interests. The pro-business bias of the major
93. See, e.g., KEY TEXTS, supra note 89, at 81-82.
94. Margaret A. Blanchard, The Hutchins Commission, The Press and the Responsibility
Concept of Journalism, JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS, no. 49, May 1977, at 18.
95. See generally MORRIS L. ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDOM (1946).
96. Id. at 78.
97. Id. at 127.
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papers allegedly appeared not only in editorial content but also in news
reporting. Publishers, who saw the New Deal as a threat to their
financial interests, attacked President Roosevelt and organized labor.
Robert McCormick's Chicago Tribune declared that “‘a New Deal vote
is an invitation to murder’ and depicted FDR alongside Mussolini,
Stalin, and Hitler as the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse.”98 Waving
the banner of freedom of the press, publishers fought against the
application of new federal social welfare and labor laws to the press.
Among their assaults on the New Deal, the major publishing
associations brought unsuccessful First Amendment challenges in court
against the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair Labor Standards
Act.99 Public resentment mounted. Hearst, Pulitzer, and the other major
publishers were attacked as “lords of the press” who wielded power for
their own ends and propagated their own opinions, especially in matters
of politics and economics.100 It was widely believed that the press was
the single greatest influence over public opinion, and that the public
mind had fallen under the sway of the “despotism” of publishers who
dealt in “half-truths or whole lies.”101
According to left-wing critics, the major publishers had effectively
created an airtight system of ideological uniformity. With the publishing
industry largely concentrated on the right, there was no “clash of
opinion” between newspapers, depriving the public of the opportunity to
hear competing views.
Nor were there discussions of diverse
perspectives on public affairs within any given newspaper or broadcast.
The partial view of society presented in the media distorted public
opinion in favor of the status quo.102 Because newspapers and broadcast
stations were under no duty to sell or offer space to the public, minority
voices never appeared. “There were and are . . . groups in their
communities who never can get their aspirations, their points of view,

98. Stephen Bates, Realigning Journalism with Democracy: The Hutchins Commission, Its
Times, and Ours, available at http://www.annenberg.northwestern.edu/pubs/hutchins.
99. See Blanchard, supra note 71, at 228 n.12.
100. See generally, O.W. Riegel, Propaganda and the Press, ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. OF
POL.AND SOC. SCI., May 1935, at 201.
101. George Fort Milton, The Press and Public Opinion: The Function of The Newspaper,
PUBLIC OPINION Q., Jan 1938, at 55-56.
102. As news of religious and ethnic persecution in Europe reached American audiences in the
latter 1930s, and as domestic labor conflict reached new heights, liberal social critics focused
increasingly on intergroup relations and the political and cultural dimensions of the minority
experience. Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91
YALE L. J. 1287, 1298-99 (1982).
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printed in the columns of these newspapers,” complained Oswald
Garrison Villard, former editor of the Nation, in 1938.103
When the First Amendment was adopted, presses were cheap, and
“anybody with anything to say had comparatively little difficulty in
getting it published,” one critic wrote.104 If a publisher wanted to use his
paper as his own personal soapbox, there was little danger to the public,
because opponents could start another publication,105 or “various
opinions might encounter each other in face-to-face [public]
meetings.”106 This open and accessible system of public debate had
become a vestige of the past. The media were the gatekeepers to the
public mind, the engineers of public opinion. The average citizen’s
ability to address a public audience was entirely at the sufferance of the
media owners.
2. Alienation and Disengagement
While the concentration of the media in the hands of the economic
elite thwarted democracy by prohibiting diverse social groups from
accessing the means of public communication, the media also impeded
democratic participation by distorting the human relationships that made
meaningful communication possible. This critique of the media had
flourished in the 1920s and persisted in the academic thought and
popular culture of the 1930s.107 Although John Dewey believed that the
power of the media could be harnessed to reinvigorate social
relationships and create the “Great Community,”
mass
communications—“relatively impersonal and mechanical”—could also
erode the “depth of close and direct . . . attachment” between people.108
As sociologist Ernest Burgess commented in 1928, when people
depended on the media, rather than their communities, as a source of
information and companionship, the possibility of intimate and
sympathetic interpersonal communication was destroyed.109 In Dewey’s

103. Oswald Garrison Villard, Freedom of the Press, PUBLIC OPINION Q., Jan. 1938, at 58.
104. THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS: A
GENERAL REPORT ON MASS COMMUNICATION: NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, MOTION PICTURES,
MAGAIZINES, AND BOOKS 14 (1947) [hereinafter THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS].
105. Id.
106. Id. at 15.
107. See KEY TEXTS, supra note 89, at 15.
108. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS, 98, 143, 213 (1927).
109. E.W. Burgess, Communications, AM. J. OF SOC., vol. 34, no. 1 (Jul. 1928).
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words, mass communications “disintegrated the small communities of
former times.”110
Media critiques were filled with accounts of the subversion or
destruction of traditional community rituals by the solitary, superficial
practices of media consumption.111 In their famous 1929 sociological
study of Muncie, Indiana, published as Middletown, Robert and Helen
Lynd had observed how public oratory, once a major form of public
entertainment, had been replaced by newspaper and magazine reading.112
Unlike the public lecturing that took place at summer picnics and fairs,
with their opportunities for public interaction and conviviality, the media
so avidly consumed by Muncie residents were produced entirely outside
the community.113 Rather than discuss ideas with their neighbors,
people turned on the radio. “For every individual who listens to a street
corner address, there are tens of thousands who listen to a radio speech,”
one critic lamented.114 The media had diverted the attention of the
public away from important concerns that affected the local community
to big-city ideas and consumer values. Novelist Sherwood Anderson, in
his work Winesburg, Ohio, noting that mass media had “worked a
tremendous change in the lives and the habits of thought of our people of
Mid-America,” observed that even the simple farmer no longer spoke his
own words but had become a mouthpiece for the press.115 He parroted
what he had read in the papers, “talking as glibly and senselessly as the
best city man.”116
The mass media often bore the brunt of a more generalized
criticism of modernity, urbanization, and mass culture.117 The media
were both agents and symbols of the demise of traditional ways of life.
Because of the radio, one writer lamented, “Town meetings are for the
most part regarded as relics of the horse and buggy days.”118 Critics
linked the rise of mass communications to the demise of face to face
meetings, oral discussion, and the public forum—the intimate settings
110. DEWEY, supra note 108, at 127.
111. See, e.g., KEY TEXTS, supra note 89.
112. Id. at 60.
113. Robert S. Lynd & Helen Merrell Lynd, From Middletown: A Study in Contemporary
American Culture (1929), reprinted in KEY TEXTS, supra note 89, at 60.
114. ACLU Brief at *5, Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, Nos. 554, 555 (U.S. Feb. 2, 1943),
1943 WL 71849.
115. SUSMAN, supra note 20, at 260.
116. Sherwood Anderson, WINESBURG, OHIO (1919), quoted in Susman, supra note 20, at 260.
117. The national media—newsmagazines, radio broadcasts, syndicated columns —
encouraged communities to “orient themselves outward,” as did chain stores, national brands, and
the centralization of government power under the New Deal. Bates, supra note 98.
118. ACLU Brief, supra note 114, at *5.
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and relationships that were seen as necessary for democratic
participation to flourish.119
3. The Critical Need for Public Forums
Mass media’s perceived monopoly over popular consciousness and
the means of communication led to a movement in the 1930s to
democratize communication. This “public forum movement,” as I call
it—a diverse and diffuse body of lawyers, activists, and intellectuals—
sought to counter the media’s distorting effects on public discussion.
They did so by encouraging alternative, non-media forms of
communication, and seeking legal means to compel the mass media to
facilitate the expression of minority speakers, particularly those that
challenged the interests of big business. These critics proposed that the
mass media be legally required to serve as “public forums,” venues
where speakers representing all social groups could express their ideas
and competing perspectives on public affairs could be discussed and
debated.120 Because media owners, on their own accord, would never
subsidize the speech of groups hostile to their political interests—or
offensive to their audiences and advertisers—the only way these forums
could be created was through government involvement. The state must
impose requirements that the media cover public issues from all points
of view and grant access to minority speakers, even if this meant
denying other speakers’ requests for airtime or newspaper space.
Because Progressive civil libertarians in this period did not frame
freedom of speech solely in terms of autonomy interests, as in later
years, but as a positive right to participate in self-government, the state
was not yet “an enemy.”121 Many associated the protection of civil
liberties with economic and social justice, which could be secured
through social welfare legislation. By creating the material conditions
for the effective exercise of speech rights, the government could
affirmatively advance the goals of the First Amendment. As historian
Laura Weinrib writes, the 1920s and 1930s was a transitional period in
the history of civil liberties in which the right to free speech was not
entirely negative but was “nonetheless countermajoritarian.”122

119. See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., 2 GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS
(1947).
120. See examples throughout article.
121. Laura M. Weinrib, From Public Interest to Private Rights: Free Speech, Liberal
Individualism, and the Making of Modern Tort Law, 34 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 187, 201 (2009).
122. Id.
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In his influential treatise Government and Mass Communications,
Chafee argued that the First Amendment permitted the government to
expend resources on communication facilities for private speech.123 He
advocated state-created “physical facilities for communication” in the
form of “Hyde Parks,” auditoriums, and meeting halls.124 But the state
could not constitutionally dictate the expressive uses of privately owned
media, Chafee insisted.125 Yet other liberal intellectuals and activists
argued that the First Amendment allowed the state to compel privatelyowned communication facilities to provide minimum access to the
public and to present the views of underrepresented groups.126 This
affirmative view of freedom of speech was developed and used in
campaigns to turn the radio and newspapers into public forums.127
II. RADIO AS A PUBLIC FORUM
A.

The Broadcast Reform Movement

Broadcasting was in many ways the most appropriate “place” to
create a public forum in the 1930s. Most American families owned a
radio and broadcasting had become the focal point of public attention, a
major source of news and entertainment, and a medium for national
politics.128 When broadcasting was introduced in the 1920s, it was
predicted to have great democratic and educational potential.129 Its wide
dissemination, the minimum financial outlay it demanded from listeners,
and the fact that it was transmitted directly into the home made it the
“most powerful instrument of social education the world has ever
seen.”130 Radio gave the public easy access to information about public
affairs. Many envisioned that the radio would integrate rural Americans,
the elderly, immigrants—society’s outsiders—into the mainstream social
fabric.131 When marginalized groups turned on the radio, they

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See generally CHAFEE, supra note 119.
Id. at 479.
See GRABER, supra note 41, at 162-63.
See generally GRABER, supra note 41.
Id.
On the early history of radio see STARR, supra note 23, at ch. 10 &11.
See generally ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND
DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928-1935 3-11 (1993).
130. Id. at 86.
131. See generally id.; and George V. Denny, Jr., Radio Builds Democracy, J. OF EDUC. SOC.,
vol. 14, no. 6, Feb. 1941.
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participated in a shared cultural ritual and took their place in a national
community of listeners.132
By the mid-1930s, however, it was widely recognized that radio
had not lived up to its democratic potential. Radio had become almost
entirely commercial, and ad agencies wrote and controlled major
broadcast programs.
The critiques of partisanship, concentrated
ownership, and viewpoint homogeneity applied equally to radio as print
journalism. The networks dominated the airwaves, and during the
1930s, newspaper-radio cross ownership became increasingly common.
By 1940, out of 897 licensed stations, 298 were associated with
newspapers.133
Perhaps even more than print journalism, radio
broadcasting was said to exert a totalizing force over public discourse.
The major difference between broadcast and print journalism was
broadcasting’s tie to the state. Congress, in the Radio Act of 1927,
asserted that the government owns the airwaves and may license them to
licensees to hold in trust for the benefit of the people.134 Broadcast
stations were privately owned and had the right to exclude others from
their segment of the airwaves, but their right to operate was granted and
conferred by the government. In granting licenses to broadcast stations,
the Federal Radio Commission, the administrative agency created by the
Act, was supposed to consider a variety of factors, including the
financial and technical qualification of the applicant, the applicant’s
character, and whether it met the “public interest” standard.135 In
exchange for the free and exclusive right to use part of the radio
frequency spectrum, licensees were obliged to air programming in the
“public interest”—that would serve the “public convenience, interests, or
necessity.”136 Congress left it to the Commission to define the standard.
In 1934, Congress passed the Communications Act, the successor to the
Radio Act, and delegated regulatory power to the Federal
Communications Commission, the FRC’s replacement.137

132. Denny, supra note 131.
133. The Guild Reporter, ACLU PAPERS (Mar. 15, 1942), microformed on American Civil
Liberties Union Archives: The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917-1950, MFILM N.S. 15069, GUIDE
JC599 .U5 A445 1996 (Scholarly Res.).
134. Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1163. On the history of the “public trustee” doctrine, see Anthony E. Varona, Out of
Thin Air: Using First Amendment Public Forum Analysis to Redeem American Broadcasting
Regulation, 39 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 149 (2005) 154-57.
137. 47 U.S.C. § 301.
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A section of the Federal Communications Act explicitly prohibited
government censorship over radio content.138 It stated that nothing
“shall be understood . . . to give the Commission the power of
censorship over the radio communications” and that “no regulation or
condition shall be promulgated . . . by the Commission which shall
interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.”139 And yet the public interest licensing standard
implied FCC authority to exert content-based discrimination. Although
the FCC never clearly defined the standard, early on, it equated the
“public interest” with commercial broadcasting. In a 1929 order, the
Radio Commission determined that the stations that best served the
public interest were those that served the “entire listening public within
the listening area of the station.”140 This meant “general public service”
stations—commercial stations—rather than what it described as
“propaganda” or political stations.141 Following the implementation of
this order, license applications from noncommercial broadcasters were
routinely denied.142
In the early 1930s, civic, religious and labor groups mobilized in
opposition to the FRC’s strictly commercial interpretation of the public
interest standard. The most vocal advocates included the Chicago
Federation of Labor, the Pacific-Western Broadcasting Federation, a
nonpartisan coalition supported by a variety of civic and religious
groups, and the American Civil Liberties Union.143 Their goal was a
policy requiring the set-aside of a certain portion of the spectrum for
noncommercial broadcasting.144 They believed that radio must serve as
a public forum for communication, one accessible to speakers of all
backgrounds and interests, and that this could never be achieved under a
purely commercial system.145 They rallied behind the Wagner Hatfield
Amendment to Communications Act, which had proposed a set aside of
25% of all radio facilities for the use of nonprofit organizations.146 In
the face of opposition from the networks and the American Bar

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011
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Association, the proposal failed.147 American broadcasting became a
system dominated by nationwide chains supported by commercial
advertising.148 The radio reform efforts intensified.
B.

The ACLU and the Radio Public Forum

Of all the interest groups in the broadcast reform movement, the
ACLU, the focus of this section, was most cognizant of the
constitutional dimensions of radio regulation and worked actively to
define a principle of freedom of speech in the broadcasting context.149
The civil libertarian organization had been created in the wake of the
post World War I Red Scare in the interests of securing the speech rights
of society’s least popular and most marginalized groups—organized
labor, socialists, anarchists, racial minorities, even the Ku Klux Klan. Its
founding and affiliated members included the many of the most
esteemed Progressive lawyers and legal academics of the time.150 At the
head of the ACLU’s broadcast reform effort was Morris Ernst, a New
York civil liberties lawyer best known for his fight against censorship.
Within the ACLU, Ernst was known as a liberal individualist who
defined freedom of speech in negative terms.151 In the radio context,
however, Ernst urged state involvement in broadcast content as a means
to achieve the necessary material conditions for public discussion and
the participation of minority groups in public debate.152
In the 1930s, Ernst and the ACLU’s Radio Committee153 feared two
different kinds of censorship. The first was government censorship—the
147. Many of the top members of the ABA Standing Committee on Radio had connections to
the networks. See id. at 131.
148. Id. at 129.
149. Yet as communications historian Louise Benjamin notes, “freedom of speech” was
mobilized by virtually every interest group with a stake in radio, from government regulators to
broadcast stations to political opposition groups. Every group devised its own constitutional or
quasi-constitutional rationale to support its interests. See LOUISE M. BENJAMIN, FREEDOM OF THE
AIR AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN BROADCASTING TO 1935 (2001).
150. Including Roger Baldwin, a leader of the American Union Against Militarism, which
opposed American involvement in World War I, the radical feminist and pacifist Crystal Eastman,
and Walter Nelles, a former corporate attorney in New York. Zechariah Chafee had worked closely
with the ACLU. See David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing
Conceptions of Free Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REV. 100-01 (1992).
151. Laura M. Weinrib, Lawyers, Libertines, and The Reinvention of Free Speech, 1920-1933
(2009),
available
at
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ecm_dlv3/groups/public/@nyu
lawwebsiteacademicscolloquialegal_history/documents/documents/ecmpro063101.pdf.
152. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 129, at 81.
153. The Radio Committee was formed in 1933. The ACLU also had a committee called the
National Council on Freedom from Censorship, formed in 1931, which was also active in radio
censorship issues. See id. at 82; BENJAMIN, supra note 149, at 192.
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FCC’s denial or revocation of a broadcast license to politically
unpopular or controversial broadcasters. In 1931, the ACLU got
involved in the case of pastor Bob Shuler, who used broadcasts on his
station to make defamatory attacks on public officials, Catholics, and
Jews.154 The FRC denied his application for license renewal, and with
the help of the ACLU, Shuler appealed the decision on free speech
grounds. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the FRC’s decision, stating that the
First Amendment did not prohibit the Commission, in the public’s
interest, from denying licenses to those who used the radio for
defamation.155 The Shuler case, the first case in which a federal court
dealt directly with the constitutional issue of freedom of speech over the
air, affirmed the authority of the FRC to consider past program
performance at license renewal time.156 During the 1930s, the ACLU
continued to devote much of its attention to contesting license denials of
stations that broadcast politically controversial views.157
Yet at the same time, the ACLU Radio Committee encouraged the
FCC to make content-based licensing decisions in an effort to eradicate
“private censorship” of the airwaves by station owners.158 The ACLU
had conducted a series of studies in which it found numerous cases of
radio stations refusing time to unpopular political groups or forcing them
off the air.159 In 1935, the Radio Committee described censorship at the
stations by the managers, rather than government censorship, as the
primary threat to free speech on the radio.160 The Committee advocated,
either by statute or regulation, the creation of a “public interest” standard
that would require stations to devote time to controversial issues and to
present alternative viewpoints on public affairs.161
“We have
concluded—not without wistful glances in other directions, however—to
abandon the notion that censorship means exclusively government
censorship,” the Committee wrote in a 1935 policy statement.162 “We
154. Trinity Methodist Church, South v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 851; Charley Orbison, “Fighting Bob” Shuler: Early Radio Crusader, 21 J. BROAD.
459 (1977); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 16
(1987).
157. See generally MCCHESNEY, supra note 129, at ch. 4.
158. Id. at ch. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9.
159. Id.
160. Report on Radio Censorship, ACLU PAPERS (Apr. 24, 1935), microformed on American
Civil Liberties Union Archives: The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917-1950, MFILM N.S. 15069,
GUIDE JC599 .U5 A445 1996 (Scholarly Res.).
161. See Draft of Letter to the Members of the Federal Communications Commission (Mar. 27,
1939) (on file with author) [hereinafter Draft of Letter].
162. Report on Radio Censorship, supra note 160.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

25

Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 6

11-BARBAS_44 3 PROOF-DONE.DOCM

834

8/15/2011 2:25 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:809

have concluded that so long as Congress has power under the Commerce
Clause to regulate communication, it must and will so do according to
some standard, and that, by definition, such regulation implies the power
to deal with program content.”163
This effort was a response, in large part, to the networks’ refusal to
sell time to organized labor.164 In the 1930s, labor unions, one of the
ACLU’s major constituencies, had hoped to use radio as an organizing
tool, for publicity, and to create a unified working-class culture.165 The
networks justified refusing selling time to labor by claiming that labor
messages were almost always “controversial issues.”166 The National
Association of Broadcasters, representing 500 member stations, had
written a code of self-regulation in which it urged station owners not to
sell radio time for the presentation of “controversial issues,” since if
stations sold time to political groups for the discussion of such issues,
only groups that could afford to pay would be represented on the air,
skewing public opinion.167 The ACLU believed that this was a pretext
for animus against labor and attacked the NAB code as censorship in its
worst form.168 No labor organization could buy time on the networks,
although “business under the cover of sponsored programs can get its
propaganda across freely.”169 The ACLU complained to the FCC, but
under the Radio Act, content discrimination by station management
could not be used as the basis for denying license renewal.170 When they
did sell time to labor, most stations demanded that the speakers provide
advance scripts. When speakers veered from their scripts, the stations
turned their microphones off.171
The ACLU subsequently embarked on an effort to secure the
passage of equal-time and equal-access laws that it claimed would turn
radio broadcasts into “open forums reaching millions” and eliminate the

163. Id.
164. See Memorandum for Labor Unions Indicating the Necessity for Supporting Bills S.2755,
S.2756, S.2757 & H.R. 3038, H.R. 3038, H.R. 3039 (Dec. 1937) [hereinafter Memorandum for
Labor Unions].
165. See ELIZABETH FONES-WOLF, WAVES OF OPPOSITION: LABOR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
DEMOCRATIC RADIO (2006).
166. Excerpts from the NAB Code Manual (1939), reprinted in LLEWELLYN WHITE, THE
AMERICAN RADIO: A REPORT ON THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES FROM
THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 249 (1947) [hereinafter THE AMERICAN RADIO].
167. NAB 1939 Standards of Practice (1939), reprinted in THE AMERICAN RADIO, supra note
166, at 242-43.
168. FONES-WOLF, supra note 165, at 91.
169. See Memorandum for Labor Unions, supra note 164.
170. See generally Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162.
171. Memorandum for Labor Unions, supra note 164.
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“unfair practice of broadcasting one-sided propaganda.”172 In 1932,
Ernst and the ACLU’s National Council on Freedom from Censorship
had been involved in the drafting of an ultimately unsuccessful
amendment to the Communications Act that would have required
stations to air speakers representing both sides of important public
issues.173 In 1935, the Radio Committee drafted a bill for “Unrestricted
Discussion of Public Issues,” subsequently introduced by California
Representative Byron Scott.174 It attempted to enlist seventy-five
educational, church, liberal, and labor organizations—what it described
as a coalition of “the outs”—behind the proposed legislation.175 The bill
would amend the Communications Act to require each licensee to set
aside periods on desirable times of the day and evening for “uncensored
discussion on a nonprofit basis” for “social, political and economic
problems, and for educational purposes.”176 The bill required that
anytime a station aired a controversial issue, it must “give a hearing to at
least two sides of every issue presented.”177 Licensees would be relieved
of responsibility to the FCC and the courts for any defamatory
statements on those broadcasts.178 The ACLU claimed the bill would
extend free speech to radio through the “establishment of radio open
forums on every station in the country.”179
The Scott bill failed to receive hearings at the committee level.
Even the traditional liberal allies of the ACLU feared the broadcast
lobby and did not want to be connected with the legislation.180 The
proposal did, however, push station owners to more frequent use of the
“public forum” radio format. “Public forum” programs, which became
common during the mid-1930s, were often touted as surrogates for the
“Colonial ‘town hall’ meeting.”181 The NAB described the radio public
forums as programs “wherein the clash of opinions and ideas are
broadcast in a radio-forum debate so that the greatest number of citizens
may hear the issues, evaluate the different opinions advanced, and act

172. See Memorandum, Freedom of the Air, ACLU PAPERS (1935), microformed on American
Civil Liberties Union Archives: The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917-1950, MFILM N.S. 15069,
GUIDE JC599 .U5 A445 1996 (Scholarly Res.) [hereinafter Freedom of the Air].
173. BENJAMIN, supra note 149, at 195.
174. See MCCHESNEY, supra note 129, at 237.
175. Freedom of the Air, supra note 172.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. MCCHESNEY, supra note 129, at 237.
181. THE AMERICAN RADIO, supra note 166, at 246.
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upon them.”182 Although stations maintained the policy of refusing to
sell time on “controversial issues,” the NAB Code did direct station
owners to provide free time for forums devoted to the “presentation of
public questions including those of controversial nature.”183 The time
was to be allotted with “fairness to all elements in a given
controversy.”184 When they did air, the forum programs often tried to
replicate the classic town meeting—the speakers were unpolished and
the debate frank.185 However the programs’ rough quality made them
unpopular, and broadcasters used their low ratings as a justification for
shutting them down.186 A study in the 1940s found that only 15% of the
country had been exposed to public forum programs, at the rate of about
an hour a week, with half of it outside the best listening periods.187
After the failure of its legislative efforts to create public forums on
the air, the ACLU Radio Committee turned its attention to the FCC. It
urged the Commission to amend its regulations to require as a licensing
condition that radio stations devote a set amount of time each week to
discussion of controversial issues and that stations putting on programs
involving controversial public issues extend equal time to at least one
important, representative contrary view.188 It advocated the adoption of
a public interest standard that would “encourage as great diversity as
possible” in program content.189 These proposals for content-based
regulation of the airwaves stirred the vocal opposition of the broadcast
interests.190 The ACLU’s ideal of public discussion on the radio was a
kind of managed debate in which the FCC, moderating the dialogue
through its licensing conditions, made sure that particular groups were

182. Id.
183. Id. at 242.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 214-15.
186. Id.
187. THE AMERICAN RADIO, supra note 166, at 214.
188. Draft of Letter, supra note 161.
189. Id.
190. On broadcasters’ opposition to broadcast reform regulation, see MCCHESNEY, supra note
129, at 117-20.
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represented and that certain topics were discussed.191 This was the
essence of censorship, the broadcasters argued.192
In the course of these battles, the ACLU began to articulate a
constitutional rationale for government involvement in radio.193 The
First Amendment ideal of public discussion demanded that the state keep
open the “channels to the marketplace of ideas” and that the public have
access to diverse points of view.194 State supervision of broadcast
content in this interest was constitutionally legitimate because of the
structural properties of broadcasting. Because of the finite number of
radio frequencies, not everyone could speak on the radio. When
unpopular groups were denied space in a newspaper, they could
potentially start an opposition outlet, but this was impossible in the radio
context, given the constraints of the licensing system. Freedom of the
press, which meant the right to unfettered editorial discretion, was
different from freedom of speech on the air.
The ACLU publicized this theory in its efforts in the latter 1930s to
break the major networks’ hold over broadcasting.195 Morris Ernst, who
wrote a book length treatise on the topic, believed concentrated
ownership of the media to be the single greatest threat to freedom of the
press in modern times.196 Although the Communications Act had
provided that licenses could be revoked if a station violated the antitrust
laws, by the mid-1930s it was widely acknowledged that monopolistic
practices in radio were widespread.197 In the late 1930s, the FCC, under
the direction of James Lawrence Fly, appointed by FDR in 1938 to
contain anti-New Deal sentiment on the radio, held hearings on radio
ownership in which the ACLU participated.198 The hearings led to new
191. This would later be described by Alexander Meiklejohn as the First Amendment model of
the democratic “town meeting.” Meiklejohn wrote well after the 1930s, but his model of managed
debate as the ideal democratic speech situation was influenced by the broadcast reform movement.
See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 25 (1948). For critiques of the town meeting model, see Post, supra note 8, at 1114;
Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV 20, 40
(1975).
192. MCCHESNEY, supra note 129, at 117-20.
193. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON FREEDOM FROM CENSORSHIP (Jan. 5, 1939).
194. ACLU Brief, supra note 114, at *5.
195. For a general discussion of major network monopoly, see ERNST, supra note 95.
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., id. at 127.
198. Ernst urged the ACLU Radio Committee to support a proposed FCC rule against
newspaper-radio cross-ownership, but Arthur Garfield Hays, one of the ACLU’s founders and one
of the most avowedly libertarian on freedom of speech, successfully opposed the proposal, claiming
that it would violate the First Amendment rights of newspapers, who would have lesser rights than
other potential station owners. Statement by Arthur Garfield Hays on Press-Radio Relation, ACLU

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

29

Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 6

11-BARBAS_44 3 PROOF-DONE.DOCM

838

8/15/2011 2:25 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:809

regulations that, in the interest of increasing local programming,
prohibited networks from owning more than one station in any locality,
gave affiliated stations the right to refuse a network program, and
mandated the breakup of the two largest networks.199 The networks
challenged the rule, claiming that the FCC’s role was limited to policing
the wavelengths to prevent stations from interfering with each other and
that any regulation beyond that was a violation of freedom of the
press.200
In 1942, in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, the District Court
for the Southern District of New York rejected the networks’ claim.201
Hand stated that the FCC’s prohibition on network contracts did not
violate but furthered freedom of speech, since the interests protected
were the “very interests which the First Amendment itself protects”—
listeners’ interest in a wide range of programming.202 The networks
appealed to the Supreme Court, and a team of five lawyers on the
ACLU, including Ernst, filed an amicus brief that characterized freedom
of speech as embodying an affirmative requirement that the public have
“access to diverse points of view and the right to pick and choose among
them,”203 which was an essential condition of public discussion. The
state had a duty to “sponsor developments which . . . encourag[e] such
diversity” and discourage “bottleneck contractual devices.”204 Because
of the scarcity of radio frequencies and the powerful influence of the
radio over public opinion, the state must regulate broadcasting to ensure
that what went over the “radio pipe lines into the market of thought” was
the “product of as many minds as possible.”205

PAPERS (Mar. 5, 1942), microformed on American Civil Liberties Union Archives: The Roger
Baldwin Years, 1917-1950, MFILM N.S. 15069, GUIDE JC599 .U5 A445 1996 (Scholarly Res.).
Hays believed this would result “in the theory that the first avenue of communication to the public
which an individual selects is the only way in which he can communicate his ideas.” The ACLU
ultimately issued a statement, which it sent to FCC Commissioner Fly, that the Union was
concerned that concentrated ownership of radio stations and newspapers “monopolized the channels
of communication,” but that the fact that newspapers “are engaged in dealing with information and
opinion should not disqualify them as applicants for radio licenses.” Letter to James Lawrence Fly,
ACLU PAPERS (Apr.1, 1942), microformed on American Civil Liberties Union Archives: The
Roger Baldwin Years, 1917-1950, MFILM N.S. 15069, GUIDE JC599 .U5 A445 1996 (Scholarly
Res.).
199. See POWE, supra note 156, at 32.
200. Id. at 33-34.
201. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 47 F. Supp. 940 (1942).
202. Id. at 946.
203. ACLU Brief, supra note 114 at *4.
204. Id.
205. Id. at *7.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss3/6

30

Barbas: Creating the Public Forum

11-BARBAS_44 3 PROOF-DONE.DOCM

2011]

8/15/2011 2:25 PM

CREATING THE PUBLIC FORUM

839

In an opinion by Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court gestured
towards the ACLU’s position.206 The structural limitations of radio—the
scarcity of radio frequency—made freedom of the air different from
freedom of the press. Because not everyone who wanted to speak on the
radio could have access to the airwaves, it was not a violation of the
First Amendment rights of broadcasters for the FCC to selectively grant
licenses consistent with the “public interest.”207 The FCC was not
merely to play traffic cop of the airwaves, but to determine the
“composition of that traffic.”208 There were two possible interpretations
of the Frankfurter opinion that were debated the time—one that the FCC
could only control the “methods of competition” used by station owners,
and the other that the FCC could supervise radio content.209 Zechariah
Chafee advocated the former position,210 although the latter was widely
held211 and has since been affirmed by courts upholding the First
Amendment validity of FCC regulation of broadcast programming.212
Freedom of the press meant an “unfettered editorial page,” FCC
Commissioner James Fly often said, while “freedom of the radio” meant
that licensees fulfill their “duty” of free speech.213 This duty, to present
“all the facts and all points of view,” was “correlative to the right of the
people to hear – a right essential to the preservation of democratic
processes.”214 In the 1940s, the FCC used this rationale as the
justification for a public interest standard that seemed to move towards
the ACLU’s goal of “as great diversity as possible” on the air.215 In
1940, the FCC issued its “Mayflower doctrine” in a case in which it
denied a license to a station that had broadcast only the anti-Roosevelt

206. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
207. Id. at 226-27.
208. Id. at 216.
209. CHAFEE, supra note 119, at 580.
210. Id.
211. “There must be government regulation of radio in order to secure freedom of speech.
Otherwise private censorship might effectively exclude minority groups from the air.” Radio
Censorship and the Federal Communications Commission, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 450 (1939); see also
Radio Regulation and Freedom of the Air, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1220 (1941).
212. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 395 (1969) (describing the decision in
NBC: “The court upheld the regulations, unequivocally recognizing that the Commission was more
than a traffic policeman concerned with the technical aspects of broadcasting and that it neither
exceeded its powers under the statute nor transgressed the First Amendment in interesting itself in
general program format and the kinds of programs broadcast by licensees”).
213. James Lawrence Fly, Regulation of Radio in the Public Interest, 213 ANNALS OF AM.
ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 102, 107 (1941).
214. Id.
215. Draft of Letter, supra note 161.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2011

31

Akron Law Review, Vol. 44 [2011], Iss. 3, Art. 6

11-BARBAS_44 3 PROOF-DONE.DOCM

840

8/15/2011 2:25 PM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[44:809

views of its owners.216 Broadcasters had an obligation not to
editorialize, to “present all sides of important public questions,” and to
“be sensitive to the problems of public concerns in the community and to
make sufficient time available, on a nondiscriminatory basis, for the full
discourse thereof.”217 The Mayflower decision was the forerunner of the
Fairness Doctrine, announced by the FCC in 1949, which imposed a
duty on stations to present controversial programming and to maintain
an overall viewpoint balance in the programming.218 Following pressure
from organized labor, in the 1940s the FCC issued an order that
essentially threw open the door to sale of time for the discussion of
controversial issues.219 In 1946, the FCC released its “Blue Book,” a
149-page report that defined the public interest standard for licensing in
terms of a “well-balanced program structure,” the carrying of local
programs, and programs devoted to public issues.220 It stated that when
ruling on a license renewal application, the FCC could consider whether
time was made available for the discussion of public issues and diverse
viewpoints and speakers were represented.221
Broadcasters attacked the new public interest standards as an
infringement of their First Amendment rights, and the postwar FCC
seemed to ignore the Blue Book in its subsequent orders and
decisions.222 The Fairness Doctrine was haphazardly enforced and
eventually abolished by the FCC.223 The radio reform activists of the
1930s and 1940s never saw broadcast become the public forum that they
had envisioned. They had, however, transformed public understandings
of freedom of speech by popularizing a new model of democratic speech
in the media age and highlighting the link between the ideal of public
discussion and access to the means of communication. In the 1940s, as
we will see in the next sections, their ideas would be mobilized in efforts
to create public forums in print journalism and public space.

216. See POWE, supra note 156, at 109-10.
217. Id.
218. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 FCC 1246 (1949), cited in POWE, supra note
156, at 111.
219. THE AMERICAN RADIO, supra note 166, at 80.
220. Id. at 192.
221. See generally id. at 182-93.
222. POWE, supra note 156, at 109; Varona, supra note 136, at 156.
223. See generally POWE, supra note 156.
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III. THE PRESS AS A PUBLIC FORUM
A.

Licensing the Press

In the midst of a wave of criticism of the press, the 1930s and
1940s saw a press reform movement that paralleled the broadcast reform
effort. The goal was similar—to involve the state in supervising the
publishing process to ensure a wider range of viewpoints in the press.
This was an essential precondition of “public discussion,” the reformers
argued, and the First Amendment permitted state action to achieve this
interest.
Yet there were more formidable constitutional obstacles to
regulating the press than radio. Content based licensing was entirely
anathema to freedom of the press, as the Supreme Court had affirmed in
Near v. Minnesota.224 Yet press reformers argued that because of the
importance of newspapers to public discourse, and the inability of
average citizens to access the press as a means of communication, the
licensing of newspapers was analogous to the licensing of radio and
would be legitimate under the same constitutional rationale.225 They
envisioned that print journalism, like broadcasting, could serve as a
forum for public discussion and the exchange of diverse views,
supervised by editors guided by “public interest” criteria designed and
enforced by the state.
Many of the arguments for newspapers as “public forums”
originated in the work of the Hutchins Commission on Freedom of the
Press. The academic commission, organized by Time-Life publisher
Henry Luce in 1944, was charged with producing a comprehensive
report on the performance of the press, and a practical and theoretical
analysis of the meaning of freedom of the press in modern times. The
Commission was headed by Zechariah Chafee and University of
Chicago chancellor Robert Maynard Hutchins, and its roster included
professors of law, anthropology, sociology, economics, and philosophy
from the most elite universities.226 The group met seventeen times over
two years and interviewed fifty-eight witnesses.227 By the time of its
1947 release, its final report, A Free and Responsible Press, had been
224. 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931).
225. See CHAFEE, supra note 119, at 695.
226. Including John Clark, a professor of economics at Columbia, Robert Redfield, professor
of anthropology at the University of Chicago, William Hocking, Harvard professor of philosophy,
Harold Laswell, a law professor at Yale, and former Assistant Secretary of State Archibald
MacLeish. See THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 104, at v-vi.
227. Id.
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revised nine times, mostly because of disagreement over the
constitutional ramifications of government involvement in publishing.228
Because of the prestige of its members and the vast public interest in the
topic of press freedom, the Hutchins Commission received tremendous
popular and scholarly attention. A Free and Responsible Press remains
one of the most important studies of the press in American history.229
The Commission began from the assumption that a reconsideration
of the principles of freedom underlying the First Amendment had
become a matter of urgent concern.230 It then described the paradox of
mass communications:
The importance of the press to the people has greatly increased with
the development of the press as an instrument of mass communication.
At the same time the development of the press as an instrument of
mass communication has greatly decreased the proportion of the
people who can express their opinions and ideas through the press.231

The Commission concluded that the press had a social
responsibility, as a condition for its freedom, to provide the public with
the information necessary for responsible citizenship and to represent
diverse views.232 The press had failed this duty, it concluded.233 Press
content was inaccurate, biased towards big business, and excluded the
views and opinions of minority social groups.234 The press did not
provide a credible and truthful portrayal of world affairs, nor
“project[ed] the opinions and attitudes of the groups in the society to one
another.”235 It had not fulfilled its social obligation to serve a public
“forum for the exchange of comment and criticism” and “common
carriers of public discussion.”236
Luce, who funded the research but exercised no control over it, had
initiated the Commission in his hope of attaining a definitive statement

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See id.
LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 27-28 (1991).
See THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 104.
Id. at 1.
On the social responsibility theory of the press, see FRED S. SIEBERT, THEODORE
PETERSON, & WILBUR SCHRAMM, FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS: THE AUTHORITARIAN,
LIBERTARIAN, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND SOVIET COMMUNIST CONCEPTS OF WHAT THE PRESS
SHOULD BE AND DO 95 (1956). “Social responsibility theory holds that the government must not
merely allow freedom; it must also actively promote it.” Id.
233. See generally THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 104, at ch. 4.
234. Id. at 21 & ch. 2.
235. Id. at 21.
236. Id. at 23.
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of freedom of the press as a principle of absolute liberty in publishing.237
This aspiration went unrealized. In fact, several Commission members
went in the opposite direction and endorsed extensive government
regulation of press ownership and content.238 Some supported content
based licensing and a public right to access the press.239
The centerpiece of this vision was a “Free Press Authority,” a
regulatory agency for print journalism similar to the Federal
Communications Commission. The authority would license newspapers
under the condition that the papers express the differing ideas, points of
view, and cultural interests of each group in the community and allow
the public to hear to varied interpretations and opinions regarding all
major public issues.240 This would be measured by governmentally
established “yardsticks” of diversity.241 Papers would have to devote
free space to minority opinions and interests proportional to their
representation in the community.242 Law professor Harold Lasswell
advocated a similar proposal that any newspaper that dominated its
community, with little or no effective competition, be forced to run a
public forum page that would be centrally edited by a government
commission.243 The purpose of the licensing system was to “assure
maintenance in all newspapers of open space and opportunity for free,
unhampered expression of opinion by citizens in the community or in
the nation, of opinions which differ from those held by publishers and
advanced in their papers.”244 Publishing delays on controversial
opinions intended to “devitalize” them would be grounds for license
revocation.245 A “Court of Appeals” under the Free Press Authority
would act on complaints.246
Another popular proposal was that the press be run as a common
carrier, with everyone who wanted access to be able to have it by paying
a standard rate.247 Aware that this would encroach on editors’ ability to
control the content of their papers, some on the Hutchins Commission

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Government News Gag Press Freedom Problem, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Apr. 8, 1944.
See Bates, supra note 98.
Id.
CHAFEE, supra note 119, at 694-95.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 694-95.
Bates, supra note 98.
HAROLD L. ICKES, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS TODAY: A CLINICAL EXAMINATION BY 28
SPECIALISTS 130 (1941).
245. Id. at 131.
246. Id.
247. CHAFEE, supra note 119, at 633.
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argued that the common carrier idea could square with the First
Amendment if it were limited to the newspaper’s news functions.248 The
news function was more important than the editorial function because of
the “need of the community to know the truth.”249 “When the press
comes in as a private news agency to supply that need, the community
has to supervise the press and is not prevented from doing so by the First
Amendment, which is concerned with the editorial function.”250 In the
end, the Commission recommended the common carrier only as an
analogue, not as a legal principle.251 None on the Commission broached
government ownership of the press, agreeing that despite the failings of
the commercial press, a privately-owned press would better serve the
interests of a democratic people than a state owned press.252
Chafee led the charge on the Commission against the licensing
proposals, which he attacked as “compulsory open-mindedness,”253
unconstitutionally vague and the “most magnificent opportunity to fetter
the press which has ever existed in English speaking countries.”254
Chafee’s primary opponent on the Commission was William Hocking, a
Harvard philosopher who had promoted the licensing proposals as
consistent with the constitutional ideal of “freedom of discussion.”255
Hocking insisted that the Commission make a distinction between
freedom of the press and freedom of speech.256 Hocking believed that
editors had the right to free speech on their editorial pages — to print
their own arguments and opinions—but freedom of the press meant
readers’ right to receive adequate news.257
Chafee acknowledged that the public had an interest in diverse
perspectives in print journalism, and that this interest was consistent
with the goals of the First Amendment.258 But press content could not
be compelled by the state consistent with the Constitution.259 Despite its
endorsement of government involvement in broadcasting, the ACLU
248. Id.
249. Id. at 633.
250. Id.
251. See Bates, supra note 98.
252. Id.
253. CHAFEE, supra note 119, at 629.
254. Id. at 696.
255. On the debate between Chafee and Hocking, see DONALD L. SMITH, ZECHARIAH CHAFEE,
JR.: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND LAW 108 (1986).
256. Id.
257. See generally WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A FRAMEWORK OF
PRINCIPLE: A REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (1947).
258. See CHAFEE, supra note 119, at 474.
259. See generally CHAFEE, supra note 119.
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shared Chafee’s position, arguing that the rationale for regulation of
radio—technological medium scarcity—did not apply in the newspaper
context and that content-based licensing infringed on freedom of the
press.260 Backed by Morris Ernst of the ACLU, Chafee advocated
antitrust law as a content-neutral mechanism to create a greater range of
viewpoints in the press through dispersed ownership.261
B.

A “Multitude of Tongues”

In the Associated Press case of 1945, the Supreme Court, while
affirming that the public has an interest in news from diverse
perspectives and sources, reiterated that government interference with
editorial control over content was constitutionally off limits, even if it
led to the presentation of public affairs from multiple viewpoints—in a
“multitude of tongues.”262 Like Chafee, the Associated Press majority
endorsed antitrust law as a potential solution to viewpoint homogeneity
in the press that was consistent with the First Amendment.
The Associated Press litigation began in 1942, when the
Department of Justice filed suit in the District Court in the Southern
District of New York against the Associated Press, the largest
newsgathering cooperative in the country.263 Under its bylaws, the AP
allowed a newspaper with membership in a given community to prevent
another in the same area from obtaining membership by demanding a
vote on the competitor’s application.264 The bylaws also required
members to supply reports of regional news solely to the Associated
Press and prohibited sharing news with nonmembers.265 It was
essentially impossible for a newspaper in this time to succeed without
AP membership. The Justice Department alleged that the AP’s bylaws
were unlawful restraints of trade that limited competition in the
newspaper industry in violation of the Sherman Act.266

260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Assoc. Press v. U.S. Tribune Co., 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting
United States v. Assoc. Press., 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943)).
263. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. at 373.
264. Margaret A. Blanchard, The Associated Press Antitrust Suit: A Philosophical Clash Over
Ownership of First Amendment Rights, 61 BUS. HIST. REV. 44 (1987).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 52. The Justice Department’s action had been spurred by the exhortations of
department store magnate Marshall Field, who had tried unsuccessfully to obtain Associated Press
membership for his new, pro-Roosevelt newspaper the Chicago Sun. Field was opposed by
publisher Robert McCormick of the Chicago Tribune, who was rabidly against the New Deal.
McCormick tried to block Field’s membership in the Associated Press. After having unsuccessfully
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The majority of the three-judge panel, consisting of judges Learned
Hand and Augustus Hand, granted the Justice Department’s motion for
summary judgment without proof of actual exclusion.267 Rather than
question whether a restraint of trade had occurred, Hand used what
Chafee advocated as a “public service theory” and distinguished
newspapers from other industries, then focused on consumer welfare
rather than just the interest of competitors.268 The opinion suggested that
the importance of the news to “the vitality of our democratic
government”269 gave the state a greater interest in supervising the press
than other industries. The First Amendment protected the public’s
interest in the “dissemination of news from as many . . . sources, and
with as many different facets and colors as is possible.”270 It
“presupposes that [the] right conclusions are . . . likely to be gathered out
of a multitude of tongues.”271
When the ACLU Board became aware of the suit, there was an
extended debate about whether to get involved in it. Ernst believed that
the case involved important civil liberties issues—the deprivation of the
public of information it should have by private forces “creating serious
bottlenecks on the news”—and that the organization should become
involved.272 Arthur Garfield Hays, one of the ACLU’s founders and a
staunch libertarian on freedom of speech, insisted that there was no civil
liberties question at stake and that it was neither the business of the
Constitution or the ACLU “to make certain that people have equal
opportunities” to engage a public audience.273
Signaling the
organization’s new trend towards the separation of economic issues and
freedom of speech, the ACLU ultimately issued a public statement that
tried other approaches to winning Associate Press membership, Field asked the Attorney General
whether it functioned as a “monopoly in restraint of newspaper competition” and thereby violated
the Sherman Antitrust Act. See Id. at 50.
267. For a discussion, see generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE
CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA (1991).
268. Id. at 209.
269. Assoc. Press v. U.S. Tribune Co., 326 U.S. 1, 29 (1945) (Douglas, J., concurring).
270. United States v. Assoc. Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943).
271. Id. Allowing more papers to receive AP service would seem to foster homogeneity in
news content, yet Hand claimed that because every paper had its own way of treating wire service
news—some placed it on the front page and others in an “obscure corner,” and the accompanying
editorials were different—the result of increased access to AP was more “diversity” and therefore
greater accuracy. The real issue was that non-AP papers could not survive, which led to further
concentration in the publishing industry. Id.
272. Letter from Morris Ernst to Roger N. Baldwin (Nov. 6, 1942) (on file with author).
273. Memorandum on the Associated Press Case, ACLU PAPERS (Sept. 23, 1942),
microformed on American Civil Liberties Union Archives: The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917-1950,
MFILM N.S. 15069, GUIDE JC599 .U5 A445 1996 (Scholarly Res.).
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private restrictions on competition in the newspaper field did not create a
First Amendment problem but was rather a question of public policy.274
The AP appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Sherman
Act could not be used against the press, since the First Amendment
shielded the press from regulation.275 The American Newspaper
Publishers’ Association claimed that if Hand’s opinion were sustained,
Americans would be confronted “just as the people of Germany today
are confronted, with a government controlled press.”276 In June 1945,
the U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, affirmed that
the AP’s bylaws violated the Sherman Act and that antitrust law could
be applied to news publishing consistent with the First Amendment.277
The Court rejected Hand’s broader “public service” approach to the case
and brought it back to a traditional restraint of trade analysis.278
“Member publishers of AP are engaged in business for profit exactly as
are other business men who sell food, steel, aluminum, or anything else
people need or want.”279 The fact that the commodity was news did not
exempt them from the obligations carried by other industries.
The principle that the First Amendment did not foreclose the
enforcement of generally applicable business regulations against the
press had been established in cases in the 1930s in which publishers had
tried to use freedom of the press as a shield against New Deal regulatory
measures.280 In a 1936 case involving the Associated Press, the Court
held that the Wagner Act281 could be used against newspaper publishers
without violating freedom of the press.282 The Wagner Act’s prohibition
on the discharge of employees on the basis of union affiliation—in this
case, editors—did not violate the First Amendment freedom to control
editorial content.283 In 1937, the Court found frivolous a claim that
274. Memorandum, ACLU PAPERS (July 6, 1942), microformed on American Civil Liberties
Union Archives: The Roger Baldwin Years, 1917-1950, MFILM N.S. 15069, GUIDE JC599 .U5
A445 1996 (Scholarly Res.).
275. “The flat prohibition against the regulation of the press in one direction, as contained in
the First Amendment, does not endow Congress with [the] power to regulate it in another direction,
even in aid of its freedom.” Brief of the American Newspaper Publishers Association as Amicus
Curiae at *9, Assoc. Press v. United States, Nos. 57, 58, 59 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1944), 1944 WL 42542
(Oct. 24, 1944).
276. J. EDWARD GERALD, THE PRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1931-1947, at 119 (1948).
277. Assoc. Press v. U.S. Tribune Co., 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
278. See generally POWE, supra note 267.
279. Assoc. Press, 326 U.S. at 7.
280. See, e.g., Assoc. Press v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 301 U.S. 103, 131-33 (1936); Senn v.
Tile Layers’ Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 482 (1937).
281. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (West 1935).
282. Assoc. Press, 301 U.S. at 130.
283. Id. at 131-33.
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newspapers enjoyed a constitutional immunity from a general
nondiscriminatory tax.284
The decree calling for revision of the bylaws, and forcing the AP to
sell on equal terms, did not interfere with editorial functions, Black
wrote.285 It did not force the AP or its members to “permit publication
of anything which their ‘reason’ tells them should not be published. It
only provides that after their ‘reason’ has permitted publication of news,
they shall not, for their own financial advantage, unlawfully combine to
limit its publication.”286 Moreover, the application of antitrust law to the
press furthered the public’s interest in diverse viewpoints in journalism,
a necessary condition of public discussion. “The First Amendment . . .
rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the
welfare of the public.”287 But government compulsion of press content
to achieve viewpoint diversity, he emphasized, was anathema to freedom
of the press.288
Frankfurter, in his concurrence, parted with Black and endorsed the
Hand position in its entirety.289 He suggested that he would have
approved more extensive government control over news publishing than
other industries because the “truth regarding public matters” was a
constitutional interest that was “indispensable”290 to public discussion
and the “vitality of our democratic government.”291 He did not think that
the commercial and editorial functions of the press could be
disaggregated, and this cut in favor of regulation of all aspects of
publishing. “Truth and understanding are not wares like peanuts or
potatoes,” so restraints on the “promotion of truth”292 invoked very
284. See Giragi v. Moore, 301 U.S. 670 (1937).
285. Assoc. Press v. U.S. Tribune Co., 326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18 (1945).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 20.
288. The majority opinion observed that the “only compulsion to print which appears in the
record” was found in AP’s bylaws, which “compel members of the Association to print some AP
news or subject themselves to fine or expulsion from membership in the Association.” Id. at 20
n.18.
289. Id. at 26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
290. Id. at 28.
291. Assoc. Press, 326 U.S. at 29. Frankfurter had been highly influenced by popular and
academic press criticism. In a 1946 case, Frankfurter complained that “[t]here are today
incomparably more effective and more widespread means for the dissemination of ideas and
information than in the past. But a steady shrinkage of a diffused ownership raises far reaching
questions regarding the meaning of the ‘freedom’ of a free press.” Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331, 355 n.2 (1946). Journalistic codes of ethics, he suggested, were “moonshine” and the press
could only be controlled with legal penalties. See id. at n.13.
292. Assoc. Press, 326 U.S. at 28.
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different considerations from comparable restraints on purely
commercial industries.293 Justice Murphy, one of the dissenters along
with Stone and Roberts, also saw the different dimensions of publishing
as intertwined, but this cut against regulation. Both he and Justice
Roberts lamented the decision as “affirmative intervention by the
government in the realm of dissemination of information” and a “first
step in the shackling of the press, which will subvert the constitutional
freedom to print or to withhold, to print as and how one’s reason or
one’s interest dictates.”294
Associated Press ushered in a wave of antitrust enforcement against
the press295 and put the imprimatur of the Court on the media reformers’
argument that the public has a constitutional interest in newspaper
journalism as a forum for diverse perspectives on public affairs. At the
same time, the decision also staked the First Amendment limitations of
government regulation of privately owned expressive property, even in
the interest of increasing public access to communication opportunities
and to information on matters of public concern. Coming on the heels of
the NBC decision, Associated Press affirmed a “dual system” of
constitutional freedom of the press.
As Lee Bollinger argues,
government supervision of radio reflects a commitment to “freedom of
discussion,” democratic deliberation and government encouragement of
a diversity of views, while the broad First Amendment protection given
to print journalism embodies a kind of “free speech laissez-faire.”296
The final report of the Hutchins Commission adopted the
Associated Press solution, suggesting only the “sparing” use of antitrust
laws to further diversity in newspaper ownership and content.
Appealing to the newspaper publishing industry’s sense of professional
responsibility, the Commission asked that the press voluntarily “accept
the responsibilities of common carriers of information and discussion,”
finance media undertakings “of high literary, artistic, or intellectual
quality,” and “engage in vigorous mutual criticism,” as professional but
not legal obligations.297 The Supreme Court, thirty years later in Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, channeled the Hutchins Commission
293. One of the most conservative on the Court on freedom of speech in this era, Frankfurter
opposed the “preferred position” theory endorsed by his colleagues and used a balancing test that
deferred heavily to legislative judgment. H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 171
(1981).
294. Assoc. Press, 326 U.S. at 48, 51 (Roberts, J. & Murphy, J., dissenting).
295. See e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
296. See BOLLINGER, supra note 229, at 110.
297. THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 104, at 92-94; CHAFEE, supra
note 119.
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when it struck down a right of reply law, concluding that “[a]
responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press
responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many other
virtues it cannot be legislated.”298 Publishers disliked the Commission
but acknowledged it, and in the late 1940s the major publishers’
associations sponsored several initiatives for editorial reform and
committees for self-examination.299 But by the mid-1950s, it was widely
believed that the press had not implemented the Commission’s
suggestions.300
The failure of the campaigns to create public forums in broadcast
and print coincided with renewed interest in old-fashioned, face-to-face
communication in the traditional public forum. In his Government and
Mass Communications, Chafee argued that because radio and
newspapers could not be used as public information highways—
“highroads” for news and ideas, he wrote301—the government should
provide streets, parks, and auditoriums to promote oral discussion.302
Outside of the media, there must be essential “physical facilities” for
Chafee believed that “the
communication accessible to all.303
construction of a municipal auditorium for public meetings is
disconnected with the possibilities of censorship of organized media.”
“[A]side from the occasional banning of an unpopular speaker or group,
harm to free speech is unlikely and positive good is plain.”304
In a series of cases in the 1940s, the Supreme Court similarly
indicated that opportunities for public speech on public property must be
protected and facilitated by the state because of limitations on citizens’
ability to use the media for communication. This obligation was
imposed by the First Amendment. The public forum doctrine reflected
the Court’s emerging awareness that the “parade, the picket, the leaflet,
[and] the sound truck”305 were the only media of communication
298. 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974).
299. See generally Blanchard, supra note 264.
300. The major publishers had also rebelled against the Associated Press decision. In 1946,
publisher Robert McCormick of the Chicago Tribune had convinced a representative from Illinois
to introduce a bill in Congress that would exempt cooperative newsgathering associations from the
nation’s antitrust laws. The ACLU, reversing its earlier position, became involved in the issue and
opposed the bill, asserting that newspapers were businesses, and they could not claim exemption
from the antitrust laws as long as those laws did not impair “freedom to print and discuss.” The
Mason bill died in committee in 1947. See Blanchard, supra note 264, at 70-82.
301. CHAFEE, supra note 119, at 479.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 477.
305. Kalven, supra note 1, at 30.
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accessible to those who lacked “money to own or control publishing
plants, newspapers, radios, moving picture studios, or chains of show
places.”306
IV. THE PUBLIC FORUM IN PHYSICAL SPACE
A.

The Public Forum Doctrine

The public forum doctrine, as articulated by the Supreme Court in
the 1940s, protects a minimum right of access to streets, parks and other
government-owned sites for expressive purposes.307 The doctrine grew
out of the same cultural environment and concerns as the “public forum”
campaigns in broadcast and print. Like the media public forums, the
physical public forum would provide communication opportunities for
groups and speakers otherwise unable to access the media. Unlike the
proposed radio and newspaper public forums, however, the physical
public forum was to be governed by the principle of viewpoint
neutrality. The forum managers would not engineer debate between
competing viewpoints, but would allow free rein to speakers, subject to
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions.308

306. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting).
307. In the public forum context, the Court has recognized that restrictions on the
distribution of leaflets and similar means of communication may have a disproportionate
effect upon those who, for reasons of finances or ideology, do not have ready access to
more conventional means of communication. In such circumstances, the Court has
reviewed restrictions on such traditional but unconventional means of communication by
a more stringent standard than other content-neutral restrictions.
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. MARY L. REV. 189, 219
(1983).
308. The central principle of the public forum, as articulated in the foundational cases of the
1940s, has been much debated. Some have argued that the essence of the public forum was equal
access. The state can entirely ban access to the forum but it cannot selectively open it to some
speakers and not others. Professor Lillian BeVier has written that the public forum cases adopt “no
norm or idealized vision of quality or quantity of public debate except that which results from . . .
government neutrality.” BeVier, supra note 2, at 102. Kenneth Karst has argued that the “equality
principle” of the First Amendment—that freedom of speech protects equal liberty of ideas—was
developed in the public forum cases. Karst, supra note 191.
But it is clear that the Court also adopted a minimum access principle—that the state
must, “even at some cost to the public fisc, have to provide at least a minimally adequate
opportunity for the exercise of certain freedoms.” LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 786, 979-80 (2d ed. 1988). Franklyn Haiman has described the public
forum as a kind of “affirmative action” for speech. Government enhancement of citizen expression
by “making available public sidewalks, streets, and parks for speeches or demonstrations” has “long
been recognized as a minimal contribution expected of the state to the facilitation of a marketplace
of ideas.” FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 297-98 (1981).
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The foundational case is Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, from 1939.309 Hague involved efforts by notorious Jersey
City Mayor Frank Hague to quash the CIO through a statute that
prohibited the distribution of pamphlets in public places, and forbade
unions leasing public halls for public meetings unless they received a
permit, which was at the discretion of city officials.310 There was also an
ordinance that required hall owners to obtain a rental permit that was
also at the discretion of city officials.311 Most cities did not require
permits for the renting of private halls, but owners who rented halls to
radicals sometimes found their licenses revoked because of the
“structural . . . condition” of the building.312
Before Hague, ordinances allowing the discretionary awarding of
permits for public speech, and closing off all public spaces for speech,
had been routinely upheld by courts as a legitimate exercise of the police
power.313 The state had the rights of a private property owner. In the
famous 1895 case Davis v. Massachusetts, Oliver Wendell Holmes, as
Chief Justice of Massachusetts’ highest court, declared that laws that
prohibited public speaking in a public park were no more an
infringement of the rights of the public than “for the owner of a private
house to forbid it in his house.”314 Courts were not sympathetic to
claims that access to public space was necessary for the exercise of free
speech rights, or that it was especially vital for minority groups who
lacked access to the press.315
In Hague, the Court transformed the state from the owner of the
streets and parks to the trustee of such public places, to which it must
provide minimum access on an equal and nondiscriminatory basis,
regardless of viewpoint.316 In dictum, Justice Roberts, writing for the
plurality, observed that the use of the streets and parks, “immemorially
. . . held in trust for the use of the public,” was for “[the] purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions” an essential part of the “privileges, immunities, rights,
and liberties of citizens.”317 The rights of speakers, however, were still

309. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
310. Id. at 500-03.
311. Id.
312. See Public Order and the Right of Assembly in England and the United States: A
Comparative Study, 47 YALE L.J. 404, 421 (1938).
313. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510 (Sup. Jud. Ct. of Mass. 1895).
314. Id. at 511.
315. See Pfohl, supra note 2, at 549.
316. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514-15 (1939).
317. Id. at 515.
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subordinate to the state’s power to regulate for the public good. The
privilege of a citizen to
use the streets and parks for communication of views on national
questions may be regulated in the interest[s] of all . . . it is not absolute,
but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general
comfort and convenience, . . . but it must not, in the guise of
regulation, be abridged or denied.318

The state could not entirely close access to the public forum, Hague
suggested, nor use permitting systems as a guise for content-based
discrimination. The ordinances were void on their face because they
were not passed to serve the general welfare and placed uncontrolled
discretion in the hands of local officials to commit “arbitrary suppression
of [the] free expression of views on national affairs.”319
The public forum doctrine was subsequently developed by the
Court in a series of cases involving traditional forms of public
communication in public places. In four cases consolidated in Schneider
v. State of New Jersey, from 1939, involving the convictions of labor
protesters, political radicals, and Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Court struck
down local ordinances that made it unlawful for any person to circulate
or distribute handbills on any sidewalk, street, or public place.320
Although the state may implement reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions, the Court held, it cannot entirely block citizen access to
traditional public forums for speech, nor resolve competing claims of
access in a discriminatory manner.321 As Harry Kalven Jr. wrote years
later, summarizing the doctrine,
In an open democratic society the streets, the parks, and other public
places are an important facility for public discussion and political
process. They are in brief a public forum that the citizen can
commandeer; the generosity and empathy with which such facilities
are made available is an index of freedom.322

Professor Robert Post has argued that the public forum concept
demonstrated a general concern with official suppression of participation
318. Id. at 515-16.
319. Id. at 516.
320. Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). A 1941 study observed that of the
fifty-five handbill cases that were brought throughout the country during the previous fifty years,
Jehovah’s Witnesses, labor unions and minority political groups were defendants in most of the
cases. See James K. Lindsay, Council and Court: The Handbill Ordinances, 1889-1939, MICH. L.
REV. 561, 590 (1941).
321. Id. at 150..
322. Kalven, supra note 1, at 11-12.
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in public discourse rather than a more specific interest in the flourishing
of public speech in public places.323 He points out that the public forum
cases technically imposed the same kind of restrictions on the
government’s ability to regulate speech in circumstances that did not
involve public forums.324 “The Court held that street demonstrations
could not be [held] . . . to the whim of official discretion,” but it applied
the same standard to distribution of pamphlets to private homes, and
speech in private halls.325 “In short,” he writes, “the precedents indicate
that the Court’s primary concern was to protect [communication] . . . and
that the geographical location of . . . [the communication] played a
relatively minor role in that concern.”326 Given the historical context,
the focus on streets, parks, and town squares has more significance than
Post has ascribed to it.
We must remember the widespread concern in this era with the
disappearance of traditional public space and local communities in the
face of nationalizing, urbanizing, modernizing forces. Critics had
claimed that as citizens retreated to their private homes to consume radio
and newspapers, public discussion and community spaces for discussion
were abandoned. Asserting a right to speak on the street was a statement
about the continued value of public space and the importance of
articulating ideas in a face-to-face context. Kalven believed that these
cases “recognize[d] the special nature and value of [that] . . . claim to be
on the street.”327 In Schneider, the majority rejected the argument that
the ordinances were limited to streets and alleys, leaving other places for
speech open.328 “The streets are natural and proper places for the
dissemination of information and opinion,” the majority stated.329 The
Court saw the street as a “kind of public hall,” in Kalven’s words, “a
public communication facility” bearing democratic significance and the
weight of historical tradition.330
Given their likely inability to speak through the press and radio, for
marginalized and oppressed groups, public spaces are an essential means
of communication. This was argued by the Bill of Rights Committee of
the American Bar Association, a group of liberal lawyers and law
professors that included Zechariah Chafee, in an amicus brief filed in
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Post, supra note 2, at 202-05.
Id.
Id. at 202-03
Id. at 203.
Kalven, supra note 1, at 19.
Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 159-60 (1939).
Id. at 163.
Kalven, supra note 1, at 12.
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Hague.331 The brief, which the Court noted and made use of, argued that
“in view of the importance of the open air meeting as a332 . . . vitally
important medium of public discussion,”333 the city must “in some
adequate manner provide places”334 for public meetings because groups
and individuals promoting unpopular causes generally “do not have the
financial means to . . . purchase time on the radio.”335 Speeches in
“municipal auditoriums, church forums, and parks in summer”336 did not
require funds to access, and therefore had a “special function in the field
of free expression that is fulfilled by no other medium.”337
The trial court had used similar reasoning when it enjoined Jersey
City officials from interfering with the union’s distribution of leaflets
and circulars.
The communication of thought, unless you believe in mind-reading,
requires some mechanical means. In the case of speech, one needs
some place to speak in and some people to listen. The public meeting
has been called the “platform of the poor.” Lacking the money or
perhaps in Jersey City the goodwill, sufficient to obtain some private
place, the would-be orators are forced to resort to publicly owned
places.338

The Third Circuit, affirming, noted that public spaces “must be
open” for the use of the people to exercise their rights of free speech and
assembly.339 “If this were not so it is obvious that these rights would be
but empty forms” for those unable to access privately owned means of
expression.340

331. Brief of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, American Bar Association, Hague v. Comm.
for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (No. 651), 1939 WL 48753.
332. Id. at *26.
333. Id. at *5.
334. Id. at *31.
335. Id. at *28.
336. See generally id.
337. Brief of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, supra note 331, at *27.
Public debate and discussion take many forms including the spoken and the printed
word, the radio, and the screen. But . . . assemblies face to face perform a function of
vital significance in the American system, and are no less important at the present time
for the education of the public and the formation of opinion than they have been in our
past history.
Id. at *7. The brief also called for the establishment of “Hyde Parks” of sufficient number and “so
located as to provide effectively for free outdoor public discussion.” Id. at *31.
338. Comm. for Indus. Org. v. Hague, 25 F. Supp. 127, 145 (1939).
339. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 101 F.2d 774, 785 (1939).
340. Id.
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This view of the public forum as the “platform for the poor” was
articulated in two prominent postwar cases involving loudspeaker
speech. Saia v. New York, from 1948, involved a Jehovah’s Witness
who gave lectures in the public park in Lockport, New York using sound
equipment mounted atop his car.341 He was arrested under an ordinance
that gave the Chief of Police discretion to reject applications for the use
of loudspeaker equipment.342 In the immediate postwar era, the dispute
between municipalities and various political and religious groups over
the use of loudspeakers became a grassroots battle for civil liberties
waged in parks and on the sidewalks and streets. In New York, groups
ranging from labor unions to the National Republican Club challenged
regulations on sound trucks and sound amplifiers that required would-be
users to obtain permits from the police department.343 Protesters without
permits took to the streets and read the First Amendment using
amplifying equipment until they were arrested.344
The majority in Saia struck down the ordinance on the grounds that
it sanctioned uncontrolled discretion by officials and hence
discriminatory access to the public forum.345 The power to approve or
deny applications gave officials the ability to conduct unconstitutional
content-based discrimination of speech.346 The law, which had the same
effect as a prior restraint, was a device for the “suppression of free
communication of ideas.”347 It could be used to deny unpopular groups
access to what was for them a crucially important medium of expression.
Particularly for those without access to the media, loudspeakers are
“today indispensable instruments of effective public speech,” Justice
Douglas observed.348 As Saia’s lawyer had written, “the radio, [and] the
public press”349 were accessible only to the highest bidder. If the mass

341. Saia v. NewYork, 334 U.S. 558, 560-62 (1948).
342. Id. at 558-59.
343. See, e.g,. Saia, 334 U.S. 558; Test of Sound Truck Ban is Noisy Despite Polite Police and
Pickets, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1948; Loudspeaker Ban Is Fought by ALP, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
1948.
344. See Test of Sound Truck Ban is Noisy Despite Polite Police and Pickets, supra note 343;
Loudspeaker Ban Is Fought by ALP, supra note 343.
345. Saia, 334 U.S. at 560-62.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 562.
348. Id. at 561.
349. See Brief for Appellant at *5, Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (No. 504), 1948
WL 47556.
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media were the sole outlets for public speech, then “free speech [was]
not available.”350
This was the argument of the dissent the following year in Kovacs
v. Cooper, in which a plurality led by Justice Reed rejected Saia’s theory
of the public forum.351 The Court upheld a Trenton, New Jersey city
ordinance that, in the stated interests of preventing the nuisance of noise
pollution, barred the use of loudspeakers mounted on any vehicle on the
city’s public streets.352 Kovacs had been arrested under the statute for
using a sound truck to publicize a labor dispute.353 The plurality
distinguished Saia because the Trenton ordinance applied across the
board to all loudspeaker use and thus avoided the problem of invidious
discretion.354 A city could constitutionally close the public forum to all
loudspeaker use, because loudspeakers forced speech on unwilling
listeners and impaired the state’s interest in public order.355 The
plurality acknowledged that “sound trucks, perhaps borrowed without
cost from some zealous supporter[s]”356 allowed minority groups to
reach large audiences but rejected the argument that they were necessary
for communication when other “easy means of publicity are open,” such
as “the human voice,” “pamphlets,”357 and “radio.”358
The dissent by Black, Douglas and Rutledge argued that the
plurality position violated the First Amendment requirement of
minimum access to the public forum.359 The notion that minority groups
could easily get time on the radio was entirely false. “There are many
people who have ideas that they wish to disseminate but who do not
have enough money”360 to “obtain the support of newspapers” or “to buy
advertising from newspapers, radios, or moving pictures.”361
“Everybody knows [that] . . . these powerful channels of communication
. . . from the very nature of our economic system, must be under the
control and guidance of comparatively few people.”362 Media owners
350. Id. See also Morrie Benson & Edward S. Resnick, Sound Amplifiers: Nuisance or Free
Speech?, 2 U. FLA. L. REV. 103 (1949).
351. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 102 (1949).
352. Id. at 78.
353. Id. at 79.
354. Id. at 82-85.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 88.
357. Id. at 89.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 103 (Black, J., dissenting).
360. Id. at 102 (Black, J., dissenting).
361. Id. at 103 (Black, J., dissenting).
362. Id. at 102 (Black, J., dissenting).
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would never give fair coverage to ideas they opposed, held by those
without “wealth and power.”363
Laws that prohibited non-media speakers from being able to reach a
public audience gave “preference” in the dissemination of ideas to the
“owners of legally favored instruments of communication”364 and
perpetuated economic and political inequalities by “tip[ping] the scales
against the transmission of ideas through public speaking,”365 the dissent
wrote. Without access to the public forum, minority groups would be
voiceless. Without the ability to use loudspeakers, they would be
drowned out by the media. The effect of the decision was to add to the
“overpowering influence” of mass media in the marketplace of ideas.366
The dissent argued, in effect, that the right to free expression included a
right to effective expression—as ACLU lawyers described it, the right
“of a man to communicate his thoughts to his fellows, and not alone the
right to express those thoughts.”367
B.

Embodied Communication

During this era of critical concern with modernity’s transformation
of social relations and the geography of everyday life, the Court
acknowledged that the marketplace of ideas is not only a metaphor—at
one point, it was really a place. It suggested that in-person speech in the
public forum, in contrast to disembodied mass communication, provokes
personal relationships and deep engagement with other citizens and
critical issues in a way that mass communications cannot. Traditional
forms of communication were well-suited to the purposes of minority
political and religious groups seeking to confront, persuade, and
challenge entrenched majoritarian thought. The Court recognized, to use
a phrase not yet in common parlance, that the “medium is the
message”—the forms and contexts of speech have communicative
impact, which must be taken into consideration when determining the
validity of any regulation of speech.368

363. Id. at 104 (Black, J., dissenting).
364. Id. at 102 (Black, J., dissenting).
365. Id. at 103 (Black, J., dissenting).
366. Id. at 102 (Black, J., dissenting).
367. Brief for Respondent at 43, Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 25 F.Supp. 127 (1939) (No.
651), 1939 WL 48838 at *43.
368. As Justice Jackson wrote in Kovacs, “The moving picture screen, the radio, the
newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator have differing natures, values,
abuses, and dangers. Each…is a law unto itself.” 336 U.S. at 97 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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The Court recognized the particular importance of access to the
public forum for religious proselytizers who depended on classical free
expression activities like pamphleting.369 Pamphleting was not only an
inexpensive means of communication for those without access to the
mass media, but it had particular persuasive power—the physical
presence of the pamphleteer forced audiences to confront the message.
In a series of decisions involving challenges to local anti-pamphleting
ordinances,370 the Court stated that the First Amendment protects the use
of public streets and parks for the distribution of pamphlets, and that
freedom of the press extended to pamphlets and leaflets. The press
“comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of
information and opinion.”371 Pamphleting, Justice Black observed in
Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, was essential to “the poorly financed
causes of little people”372—“the pamphlet, an historic weapon against
oppression, is today the convenient vehicle of those with limited
resources because newspaper space and radio time are expensive and the
cost of establishing such enterprises great.”373
The public forum not only invites a clash of opinion but sometimes
a clash of tempers. Cantwell v. Connecticut, from 1940, struck down the
conviction under a breach of peace statute of a Jehovah’s Witness who
stood on the sidewalk and played records to passers-by.374 The listeners
were outraged almost to the point of violence. Recognizing the
importance of confrontational in-person communication to the
Witnesses, who pursued their project of conversion through face-to-face
contact, the majority noted that despite the hostile audience reaction,
Cantwell had a right to be on the public street and a “right peacefully to
impart his views to others.”375 Similarly, the 1949 case Terminiello v.
Chicago invalidated the conviction of a racist street-corner speaker

369. Dissenting in a 1941 case before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals that had upheld a
license tax on the distribution of pamphlets, future Justice Wiley Rutledge, appointed to the
Supreme Court in 1943, argued that the tax “b[ore] most heavily on persons least able to afford it
and most in need of avenues of free communication . . . who do not have the money to buy radio
time and newspaper space.” Busey v. D.C., 129 F.2d. 24, 37 (1941) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The
license tax “closes their only avenue to public attention.” Id.
370. See William A. Elias, Jr., The Jehovah’s Witnesses Cases, 16 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 140
(1948).
371. The press “comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information
and opinion.” Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1939).
372. 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
373. Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 619 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
374. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
375. Id. at 308.
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under a statute that prohibited public speech that created unrest.376 The
majority opinion noted that face-to-face speech was more likely to
“create dissatisfaction” or even “stir[] people to anger” than messages
communicated through radio or newspapers.377 But a major purpose of
freedom of speech was to invite impassioned dispute, Justice Douglas
wrote.378 However, in some situations, the Court suggested, the visceral
and confrontational nature of in-person communication made it
incompatible with discursive aims of the public forum.379
Beginning with Thornhill v. Alabama in 1941,380 a series of cases
granted peaceful labor picketing the status of First Amendment protected
speech, overturning the earlier position that picketing, thought to be an
inherently violent activity, was a form of “conduct” rather than
speech.381 The Court’s movement in this direction was spurred, in part,
by the Norris La Guardia Act of 1932,382 along with the subsequent
“little Norris La Guardia Acts” passed by states, which had described
labor picketing as conduct, but sanctioned it when it was used for a
lawful purpose in a labor dispute.383 In a 1937 case, Senn v. Tile Layers’
Protective Union, the Court, upholding Wisconsin’s little Norris
LaGuardia law, first referred to picketing as a form of speech, not
conduct.384 It did so, in part, by characterizing picketing as the laborer’s
equivalent of newspaper advertisements. “In declaring such picketing

376. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
377. Id. at 4.
378. Id. “It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest.” Id.
379. Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942). In Chaplinsky, the majority
upheld a conviction of a public speaker under a state law that prohibited “face-to-face words plainly
likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee.” Id. at 573. The majority noted that certain
kinds of hostile in-person speech, when they are directed at a person with the intent to provoke a
fight, can be so powerful as to constitute incitement to action. Id. at 571-72. Chaplinsky is the only
case in which the Court has invoked the fighting words principle. See Stephen W. Gard, Fighting
Words as Free Speech, 58 WASH U. L. Q. 531 (1980).
380. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1941).
381. See Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) (finding First Amendment
protects peaceful picketing disentangled from violence). After 1937, the Court increasingly sided
with unions, a major part of the New Deal coalition. The labor movement also reconceptualized its
struggle, in part, as a quest for free expression—the right “to organize, strike, meet and picket.” See
Geoffrey D. Berman, A New Deal for Free Speech: Free Speech and the Labor Movement in the
1930s, 80 VA. L. REV. 291, 302 (1994) (quoting the ACLU).
382. 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1932).
383. Ken I. Kersch, How Conduct Became Speech and Speech Became Conduct: A Political
Development Case Study in Labor Law and the Freedom of Speech, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 255
(2002).
384. Senn v. Tile Layers’ Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 482 (1937).
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permissible,” Justice Brandeis had written, “Wisconsin has put this
means of publicity on . . . par with advertisements in the press.”385
But in a series of cases in the 1940s, the Court whittled down
Thornhill’s broad protection for picketing, designating picketing as
“speech plus”—speech enmeshed with threatening or violent physical
conduct.386
The conduct elements were not First Amendment
“speech.”387 Labor lawyers questioned why the dissemination of facts
about a labor dispute on a sign carried by a picket might considered to be
conduct, when the same words would be seen as relatively harmless if
they appeared in pamphlets, in newspapers, or were broadcast over the
radio.388 “If [a] union can constitutionally state its message on the radio,
in a newspaper advertisement, in a leaflet, or by mail, why may it not
constitutionally use a placard for the same purpose, and carry that
placard wherever citizens may lawfully be?”389 The ability to persuade
audiences was the key to good advertising and good journalism; there
was thus “no distinction between picketing and other means of [the]
dissemination of information.”390
Yet the Court never reverted back to its earlier position that labor
picketing was unprotected by freedom of speech. This may have been
spurred, in part, by the Court’s awareness of the anti-labor bias of the
major media outlets. The CIO leaders in Jersey City had tried to go on
the radio, but they were banned from the networks.391 The union was
only able to purchase time on a low-power New York station run by the
385. Id. at 479.
386. The Court did not indicate clear standards for separating speech from conduct but
suggested that picketing was more likely to be classified as conduct when it was “enmeshed with
contemporaneously violent conduct” or imminently likely to persuade viewers to commit violence.
Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1941). As
Frankfurter wrote in the majority opinion in Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753, “utterance in a
context of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument
of force.” Id. at 293.
387. As Justice Douglas noted in Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 of
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Wohl (1941), picketing by an organized group was more
like conduct than speech, since “the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or
another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated.” 315 U.S. 769,
776 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring). In such a case, “the effect may cease to be persuasion and
become intimidation and incitement to violence.” Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131, 138 (1957).
See Louis L. Jaffe, In Defense of the Supreme Court’s Picketing Doctrine, 41 MICH. L. REV. 1037
(1942).
388. Brief of Nat’l Lawyers Guild at 5, Carpenters & Joiners Union of Am. v. Ritter’s Café,
315 U.S. 722 (1942) (No. 527), 1942 WL 53602 at *5.
389. Id.
390. Brief of Cong. Indus. Org. at 6, Carpenters & Joiners Union of Am. v. Ritter’s Café, 315
U.S. 722 (1942) (No. 527), 1941 WL 52808 at *6.
391. Nathan Godfried, WCFL, CHICAGO’S VOICE OF LABOR 1926-78 197 (1997).
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Socialist party.392 As Frankfurter had observed, picketing was the
“working man’s means of communication.”393 Douglas and Black had
noted the importance of labor’s access to public spaces for picketing in
light of the prohibitively “great[] expense” necessary for unions to reach
“the public over the radio or through the newspapers.”394 Picketing was
workers’ sole means of “tell[ing] their side of the story” to the people.395
C.

The Public Forum Principle

The right to the public forum was, of course, an exceedingly limited
means of promoting the expression of disempowered groups. It applied
only to public property and therefore only to traditional means of
communication. There was no “First Amendment easement” to private
property. In 1946, the Court made one important exception in Marsh v.
Alabama, in which it assimilated private property to the status of public
property when it served a public function.396 In Marsh, the Court held
that an Alabama anti-trespass statute that prohibited distributing
literature on sidewalks could not be used to prevent the distribution of
religious pamphlets on the sidewalks of a company town, even though
they were privately owned. The sidewalks served a public function
because they were the only venues in the town that could serve as public
forums for communication. “Whether a corporation or a municipality
owns or possesses the town the public in either case has an identical
interest in the functioning of the community in such [a] manner that the
channels of communication remain free,” Justice Black wrote.397 But
Marsh did not extend to the privately-owned communications media,
leaving disadvantaged speakers without access to the most effective
forms of communication.
It has been said that the public forum doctrine reflected the Court’s
insensitivity to the problem of citizens “getting ideas before a forum.”398
Poor and unpopular speakers unable to access the media were relegated
to the least useful forms of communication. Even in the 1940s,
pamphlets and pickets “were as efficacious in a world flooded by the

392. Id.
393. Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287, 293
(1941).
394. Carpenters and Joiners Union of Am. Local No. 213 v. Ritter’s Café, 315 U.S. 722, 732
(1942) (Black, J., dissenting).
395. Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753, 312 U.S. at 320 (Black, J., dissenting).
396. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
397. Id. at 507.
398. See Barron, supra note 3, at 1652.
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communications of mass media as a blacksmith’s forge in an era of mass
industrialization,” J.M. Balkin has written.399 Indeed, the members of
the Court were undoubtedly aware that these traditional modes of
communication could not compete with the media for a public audience.
The “right to the streets” as a way of democratizing communication was
in a sense rhetorical and aspirational. Nonetheless, the public forum
doctrine represented an initial acknowledgement of the ways that
economic inequalities became speech inequalities in the media age,
reinforcing the exclusion and disempowerment of marginalized groups.
It suggested a new recognition of the conflict between mass
communications and the ideal of public discussion.
V. CONCLUSION
At a moment of profound and dislocating social transformation,
Americans in the 1930s and 1940s tried to reconcile their dependence on
mass communications with the media’s threat to public discourse. They
attempted to contain a powerful force that was seen as both hostile to the
modern social order and yet absolutely essential to it. “Public forums”
on the radio and in newspapers would help restore possibilities for
democratic discussion that the mass media had impaired. The physical
public forum, by providing a “soapbox for the poor,” would reinvigorate
the tradition of face-to-face public debate in the town square. The public
forum movement advocated new visions of the role and responsibility of
the state in creating the conditions for public discourse and the meaning
of democratic communication in the mass media age.
In the postwar era, the link between lack of access to the media and
the need for a “First Amendment easement” to public places was still
salient for members of the Supreme Court. Yet this connection came up
most often in dissents, signaling the Court’s retreat from its earlier,
broad view of the public forum. In 1965, in his dissent in Adderley v.
Florida, involving arrests for civil rights protests in front of a jailhouse,
Justice Douglas reiterated the necessity of the public forum for “[t]hose
who do not control television and radio, those who cannot afford to
advertise in newspapers or circulate elaborate pamphlets.”400 In his
dissent in the 1972 case Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, which overturned a 1968
decision that had suggested possible public forum status for shopping
malls, Justice Marshall observed that,
399. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L. J. 375, 405 (1990).
400. 385 U.S. 39, 50-51 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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For many persons who do not have easy access to television, radio, the
major newspapers, and the other forms of mass media, the only way
they can express themselves to a broad range of citizens on issues of
general public concern is to picket, or to handbill, or to utilize other
free or relatively inexpensive means of communication. The only hope
that these people have to be able to communicate effectively is to be
permitted to speak in those areas in which most of their fellow citizens
can be found.401

In the dispersed, suburban nation that the United States had become
by that time, the shopping center was the public forum.
The 1970s marked the beginning of the end of the public forum, as
the public forum doctrine crystallized into a complex set of rules that
granted the government substantial authority to control the expressive
uses of its own property and to declare sites off limits for public
speech.402 Outside of “traditional” public forums, such as streets and
parks, whether or not government property can be classified as a public
forum depends on government intent. Speech can be banned in sites the
government deems “nonpublic.” The earlier view of a state obligation to
provide citizens with minimum communication opportunities was
replaced by a strict rule of equal access that allowed flat bans on access
to the forum as long as it was done evenhandedly.403
During the 1960s and 1970s, the increasing judicial hostility to a
broad definition of the public forum, suburbanization and the demise of
urban public places, the civil rights movement’s problems accessing the
media, and public outcry over racial biases in media presentation,
spurred a renewed media reform movement. This effort, largely
identified with the work of law professor Jerome Barron, was in many
ways the continuation of the efforts of the 1930s and 1940s. In a famous
article in the Harvard Law Review, Professor Barron, referencing the
struggles of the civil rights protesters, argued that “the interests of those
401. 407 U.S. 551, 580-81 (1972). In the 1968 case, Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590
v. Logan Valley Plaza, involving labor picketers’ right to access a privately owned shopping mall,
the Court applied the minimum access requirements of the traditional public forum because the
shopping center, in a suburbanized nation, was the functional equivalent of the streets and sidewalks
of a municipal business district. 391 U.S. 308 (1968). “The largescale movement of this country’s
population from the cities to the suburbs has been accompanied by the advent of the suburban
shopping center.” Id. at 324-25.
402. On the transformation of the public forum doctrine in the 1970s and after, see G. Sidney
Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 949 (1991); Richard B.
Saphire, Reconsidering the Public Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 739 (1991); David S. Day,
The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA. L. REV. 143 (1992).
403. See BeVier, supra note 2; see also Sheila M. Cahill, Note, The Public Forum: Minimum
Access, Equal Access and the First Amendment, 28 STAN L. REV 117 (1975).
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who control the means of communication must be accommodated with
the interests of those who seek a forum in which to express their point of
view.”404 Barron proposed a judicial remedy granting individuals and
groups who wanted to voice their opinions on public affairs a right of
nondiscriminatory access to the community newspaper, and a federal
right of access statute, on the theory that newspapers assumed a quasipublic function.405 Barron had been encouraged by the Supreme Court’s
decision in the Red Lion Broadcasting case of 1969, which upheld the
constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine under a scarcity theory.406 In
the radio context, freedom of speech protected not only the rights of
speakers, but also the interests of listeners in hearing diverse points of
view.407 In a sequence of events reminiscent of twenty-five years earlier,
Barron tried to use the Red Lion rationale to defend a challenged
newspaper right of reply law.408 He was defeated in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo.409 While state-managed “public forums” in
radio were consistent with the First Amendment, the Court held,
freedom of the press did not permit government encroachment on
editors’ prerogative to control the content of their papers.410
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, the public interest
requirements in broadcasting that had equated public service with
ideological diversity and balance were also progressively dismantled. In
1972, the Court upheld an FCC ruling that stated that a broadcaster
could implement a flat ban on paid public service advertisements
without running afoul of the fairness doctrine.411 Justice Brennan’s
observation—that “the right to speak can flourish only if it is allowed to
operate in an effective forum—whether it be a public park, a
schoolroom, a town meeting hall, a soapbox, or a radio and television
frequency”412—did not command the sympathy of a majority. During
the 1980s, sweeping deregulatory efforts at the FCC led to the
elimination of many of the public interest broadcast requirements

404. Barron, supra note 3, at 1656.
405. Id. at 1666-69.
406. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
407. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). “It is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.” Id. at 390.
408. Barron, supra note 3, at 1667-77.
409. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
410. Id. at 258.
411. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 412 U.S. 94.
412. Id. at 193 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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articulated in the 1940s.413 Academic commentators’ efforts to
implement stronger public interest standards have been unavailing.414
An ongoing media reform movement continues to attack the
corporatization and concentrated ownership of the mass media and
maintains that the lack of public access to the means of communication
is the single greatest threat to freedom of speech and participatory
democracy.415 This critique has been complicated by the advent of the
internet. This is not the place to engage with the many arguments that
have been made about whether and how the internet can be
democratized and made into an authentic public forum.416 It is to
suggest, however, that the question may be as pressing for us as it was
for the American people in the first communications revolution. As
Balkin summarizes, digital media make “possible widespread cultural
participation and interaction that previously could not have existed on
the same scale. At the same time, . . . [they] create[] new opportunities
for limiting and controlling those forms of cultural participation and
interaction.”417 The internet provides potentially the “greatest forum for
communication and expression the world has ever seen,” but it is subject
to the control of a handful of “dominant, private” industries that are
under no duty to facilitate communication and expression.418 The ideal
described by the Hutchins Commission—a community bound together
by equal participation in discussion and the exchange of ideas—may be
more distant than it was when the Commission wrote.419 The public
forum campaigns of the 1930s and 1940s, however flawed and
incomplete they may have been, can provide a touchstone for our own
efforts to democratize speech in a world where communication is
everywhere but meaningful public discussion arguably remains elusive.

413. See generally Varona, supra note 136.
414. See Varona, supra note 136, at 159-61.
415. See, e.g., Robert W. McChesney, Freedom of the Press for Whom? The Question to Be
Answered in Our Critical Juncture, 35 HOFSTRA L. R. 1435 (2007).
416. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to Cyberspace,
58 Ohio St. L.J. 1535 (1998); Noah D. Zatz, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public
Forums in the Electronic Environment, 12 HARV J.L.& TECH. 149 (1998). Sunstein proposes the
creation of “deliberative domains” on the internet, sites devoted to facilitating the exchange of
ideas. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 14.
417. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV 1, 3 (2004).
418. DAWN C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE
INTERNET AGE xiii (2009).
419. See generally THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 104.
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